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We generalise Walley’s Marginal Extension Theorem to the case of any ﬁnite number of condi-
tional lower previsions. Unlike the procedure of natural extension, our marginal extension always
provides the smallest (most conservative) coherent extensions. We show that they can also be calcu-
lated as lower envelopes of marginal extensions of conditional linear (precise) previsions. Finally, we
use our version of the theorem to study the so-called forward irrelevant product and forward irrel-
evant natural extension of a number of marginal lower previsions.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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To sketch the context for this paper, let us consider a simple example. Suppose we have
two random variables1 X1 and X2 assuming values in the respective ﬁnite sets X1 and X2.
2
We have a marginal probability mass function p1 for the ﬁrst variable: for each x1 in X1,0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1 By a random variable, we mean a variable whose value is unknown.
2 We assume ﬁniteness of the sets X1 and X2 here only to make this introductory discussion as simple as
possible. We shall consider more general situations further on.
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of the value that the second random variable X2 assumes in X2.
For the second variable, we have a conditional probability mass function: for all x1 in
X1 and x2 inX2, p2ðx2jx1Þ is the conditional probability that X2 assumes the value x2, given
that X1 assumes the value x1.
We can then ask for the joint probability mass function m of X1 and X2. It is a conse-
quence of Bayes’ rule that
mðx1; x2Þ :¼ p1ðx1Þp2ðx2jx1Þ ð1Þ
is the probability that the random variable ðX 1;X 2Þ assumes the value ðx1; x2Þ in X1 X2.
It is instructive to rewrite this formula in terms of expectations, or, to use de Finetti’s lan-
guage, previsions [6]. Consider a real-valued map h on X1 X2; we shall call such maps














¼ P 1ðP 2ðhjX 1ÞÞ: ð2Þ
Here we have denoted by P 2ðhjX 1Þ the real-valued map (gamble) on X1 that assumes the
value




in x1 2 X1, where hðx1; Þ denotes the gamble onX2 given by hðx1; Þðx2Þ ¼ hðx1; x2Þ. We see,
then, that P 2ðhjx1Þ is the conditional prevision of h given that X1 assumes the value x1.
Similarly, we have denoted by P 1ðf Þ :¼
P
x1X1f ðx1Þp1ðx1Þ the (marginal) prevision of a
gamble f on X1. The concatenation formula (2) is equivalent to Bayes’ rule (1), and it pro-
vides a neat expression M ¼ P 1ðP 2ðjX 1ÞÞ for the joint prevision M in terms of the marginal
prevision P1 and the conditional prevision P 2ðjX 1Þ. This concatenation rule is also some-
times called the conglomerative property [6, Sections 4.7 and 4.19], or the law of total prob-
ability. In the language of this paper, we shall call M the marginal extension of the
unconditional prevision P1 on X1 and the conditional prevision P 2ðjX 1Þ on X2 to a joint
linear prevision on X1 X2. Since it was derived using only Bayes’ rule and the linear
character of (conditional) previsions, it is a necessary consequence of coherence in de
Finetti’s account of (subjective) probability. In fact, marginal extension is the only coher-
ent way to obtain a joint prevision from P1 and P 2ðjX 1Þ.
In his important work [10] on the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities, Walley
has generalised this result to the case where the uncertainty about the values of the random
variables is not modelled by previsions, but rather by lower and upper previsions. On this
approach, a subject’s lower prevision Pðf Þ for a gamble (or uncertain reward) f is the
supremum price he is disposed to pay for buying the gamble, or in other words, the supre-
mum s such that the subject accepts the gamble f–s. His upper prevision P ðf Þ is the inﬁ-
mum price he is disposed to receive for selling the gamble, or in other words, the inﬁmum s
such that he accepts the gamble s–f. When the lower and upper prevision for a gamble
happen to coincide, the common value is called the subject’s fair price, or (precise) previ-
sion, P(f) for the gamble f. But in contrast with de Finetti’s approach, it is not required
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prices that are equal to each other. What the two approaches to modelling uncertainty
have in common, however, is that they impose certain rationality, or coherence, require-
ments on a subject’s behavioural dispositions as summarised by his (lower or upper) pre-
visions. Walley’s behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities subsumes existing models
of upper and lower expectations [1,7], sets of probability measures [8], upper and lower
previsions, sets of desirable gambles, and preference orderings [10]. We give a reasonably
detailed introduction to this theory in Section 2.
Walley’s Marginal Extension Theorem (MET, [10, Section 6.7]) essentially states, then,
that if we have a marginal lower prevision P 1 for the ﬁrst random variable X1, and a con-
ditional lower prevision P 2ðjX 1Þ for the second random variable X2, then their marginal
extension M , given by the concatenation M :¼ P 1ðP 2ðjX 1ÞÞ, is the point-wise smallest
(i.e., the behaviourally most conservative or least committal) coherent joint lower prevision
for ðX 1;X 2Þ. Walley also shows that the marginal extension M is uniquely coherent (i.e., it
is the only coherent extension) whenever the conditional lower prevision P 2ðjX 1Þ is pre-
cise, i.e., a conditional prevision P 2ðjX 1Þ, no matter whether P 1 is precise or not.
What we shall do in this paper, and in particular in Sections 3 (for conditioning on par-
titions) and 5 (for conditioning on random variables), is generalise Walley’s result to any
ﬁnite number of partitions or random variables. This generalisation is not in any way obvi-
ous or immediate, as a comparison of our proofs with Walley’s will show. This is because
the general coherence requirements become considerably simpler to work with in the case
of a single conditioning random variable (or partition, Walley’s special case); see Sections
6.5 and 7.1, and in particular the Reduction Theorem 7.1.5 in [10] for more details.
In Section 4, we show how the marginal extension can be obtained as a lower envelope
of a set of marginal extensions of precise (conditional) previsions. This allows us to pro-
vide our Marginal Extension Theorem with an additional Bayesian sensitivity analysis
interpretation.
In Walley’s theory of coherent lower previsions, there is a powerful notion of natural
extension, which seeks to infer the (conditional) lower prevision for a gamble by making
ﬁnite combinations of given (conditional) lower prevision assessments for other gambles;
see Section 2 and [10] for more details. In Section 6, we compare natural and marginal
extension, and we show by means of a counterexample that these extensions need not gen-
erally coincide. This provides another interesting example of the well-established fact (see
[10, Section 8.1]) that natural extension may be incoherent when applied to conditional
lower previsions.
Finally, in Section 7 we show that marginal extension provides us with a natural and
interesting way of forming a ‘product’ of a number of given marginal lower previsions,
based on a special type of ‘independence’ assessment. To see how this comes about, let
us go back to the example in the beginning of this Introduction. Suppose we only have
a marginal (as opposed to a conditional) probability mass function p2 for the second ran-
dom variable X2. Then we can still use marginal extension to calculate the joint mass func-
tion, provided we can make the following independence assessment33 Nothing essential changes if we impose this requirement only for those x1 in X1 for which pðx1Þ > 0. This
restriction is often made to ensure that the symmetrical counterpart ‘p1ðx1jx2Þ ¼ p1ðx1Þ when p2ðx2Þ > 0’ is
implied by Condition (3), which turns independence into a symmetrical notion. This symmetry is not immediately
apparent in (3), and is actually broken when we generalise (3) to lower previsions. See further on.
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for all x1 in X1 and x2 in X2. In that case we ﬁnd for the joint probability mass function




p1ðx1Þp2ðx2Þhðx1; x2Þ ¼ P 1ðP 2ðhÞÞ;
where we let P 2ðhÞ be the gamble on X1 that assumes the value






p2ðx2jx1Þhðx1; x2Þ ¼ P 2ðhðx1; Þjx1Þ
in x1 2 X1. For any gamble g on X2, this tells us that the marginal prevision P 2ðgÞ of g is
equal to the conditional prevision P 2ðgjx1Þ for all x1 in X1, which is an equivalent way of
formulating the independence assessment (3). The linear prevision M ¼ P 1ðP 2ðÞÞ,
obtained using marginal extension and the independence assessment, is called the (inde-
pendent) product of the previsions P1 and P2. Observe that also
4 M ¼ P 2ðP 1ðÞÞ and that
for any gambles f on X1 and g on X2, we ﬁnd that MðfgÞ ¼ P 1ðf ÞP 2ðgÞ, which is some-
times referred to as the Product Rule, and which provides an alternative (and more directly
symmetrical) way to deﬁne independence.
Generalising this to marginal lower previsions P 1 for X1 and P 2 for X2 seems straight
forward, but there is a catch. Indeed, we can now use Walley’s Marginal Extension The-
orem to ﬁnd a point-wise smallest coherent joint lower prevision, provided we make the
following assessment:
P 2ðgjx1Þ ¼ P 2ðgÞ ð4Þ
for all gambles g on X2 and all x1 in X1. In that case MðhÞ ¼ P 1ðP 2ðhÞÞ, where, in a similar
vein as before, P 2ðhÞ is the gamble on X1 that assumes the value P 2ðhðx1; ÞÞ in x1 2 X1. A
subject who makes assessment (4) eﬀectively models that knowing what value X1 assumes
in X1 does not aﬀect his beliefs about the value that X2 assumes in X2. In Walley’s termi-
nology ([10, Chapter 9], see also [5]), X1 is then said to be epistemically irrelevant to X2. We
shall call the lower prevision M ¼ P 1ðP 2ðÞÞ the forward irrelevant product of the marginals
P 1 and P 2.
Reversing the roles of X1 and X2 in this reasoning leads to the backward irrelevant prod-
uct M 0 ¼ P 2ðP 1ðÞÞ, based on the assessment that X2 is epistemically irrelevant to X1. Inter-
estingly, and in contrast with what we have just seen for precise previsions, it does not
generally hold that M ¼ M 0, i.e., that P 1ðP 2ðÞÞ ¼ P 2ðP 1ðÞÞ; see [3] for more details and
a counterexample. This means that epistemic irrelevance is an asymmetrical notion. To
assert that X1 and X2 are epistemically independent, we have to require that X1 is epistemi-
cally irrelevant to X2 and that X2 is epistemically irrelevant to X1; see also [5] for further
discussion. The independent product ([10, Section 9.3] and [5]) of the marginals P 1 and P 2 is
then deﬁned as the point-wise smallest coherent joint lower prevision with these marginals
that expresses such epistemic independence. Such an independent product does not always
exist5, and may, if it exists, be quite diﬃcult to compute (see [10, Section 9.3.2]). In4 WhenX1 andX2 may be inﬁnite, this symmetry is no longer guaranteed if we take de Finetti’s position of only
requiring the previsions P1 and P2 to be ﬁnitely additive on events (see [6, Section 3.11] for a discussion of ﬁnite
additivity).
5 It always exists when X1 or X2 is ﬁnite, but there may be problems in case both X1 and X2 are inﬁnite; again,
see [10, Section 9.3].
192 E. Miranda, G. de Cooman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 46 (2007) 188–225contrast, the forward/backward irrelevant products M and M 0 always exist (are always
coherent), and are, as we have seen, very easy to compute.6
In Section 7 then, we use our more general version of the Marginal Extension Theorem
to generalise the notion of a forward irrelevant product to any ﬁnite number of marginals.
We also prove a number of interesting properties for this type of product, such as a gen-
eralised (but weaker) version of the above-mentioned Product Rule.
Why do we believe our results to be relevant? Our generalised version of the Marginal
Extension Theorem allows us to make most-conservative (least committal) and coherent
inferences in a straight forward manner in a number of interesting situations where the
available information has an hierarchical structure, namely, when it is characterised by
conditioning on increasingly ﬁner partitions, or by nested collections of conditioning vari-
ables. And even though, obviously, not all probabilistic or statistical reasoning falls within
the scope of marginal extension, it does so in a number of theoretically interesting as well
as practically useful situations. Let us end this Introduction with two examples. In [4], one
of us, in co-operation with M. Zaﬀalon, has used an earlier, less general version of the
MET with three variables to justify using a so-called conservative updating rule for dealing
with missing data in probabilistic expert systems based on Bayesian networks. And in [2],
we use, amongst other things, the MET in conjunction with a forward irrelevance assess-
ment, stating that ‘we do not learn about the future by observing the past’ to derive quite
powerful weak and strong laws of large numbers that subsume most of the related results
in the literature, and to weaken considerably the conditions under which such laws can be
shown to hold.
2. Coherent lower previsions
In order to make this paper reasonably self-contained, we discuss here the relevant main
ideas in the behavioural theory of coherent lower previsions, as formulated in much more
detail and depth by Walley in [10].
2.1. Basic notions and notation
We consider a subject who is uncertain about something, say, the outcome of an exper-
iment. Let X be the set of all possible outcomes, then a bounded real-valued function on X
is called a gamble on X. The set of all gambles on X is denoted by LðXÞ. A gamble f is
interpreted as an uncertain reward: if the outcome of the experiment turns out to be
x 2 X, then the corresponding (positive or negative) reward will be fx, expressed in units
of some (predetermined) linear utility.
As we have already announced in the Introduction, a subject’s lower prevision P ðf Þ for a
gamble f is deﬁned as his supremum acceptable price for buying f, i.e., the highest price l
such that the subject will accept to buy the uncertain reward f for all prices strictly smaller
than l (buying f for a price x is the same thing as accepting the uncertain reward f–x).
Similarly, a subject’s upper prevision P ðf Þ for f is his inﬁmum acceptable selling price
for f, so he accepts the uncertain reward l–f for all prices l > P ðf Þ. Clearly,
Pðf Þ ¼ Pðf Þ since selling f for a price x is the same thing as buying f for the price
x. This conjugacy relation allows us to restrict our attention to lower previsions.
6 The independent product, if it exists, dominates both M and M 0 on all gambles.
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lower prevision P ðIAÞ of its indicator IA, where IA denotes the gamble on X that assumes
the value one on A and zero elsewhere. Similarly for its upper probability, P ðAÞ ¼ P ðIAÞ.
P ðAÞ can be interpreted as the supremum rate for betting on the occurrence of the event A.
2.2. Rationality criteria
Assume that the subject has given lower prevision assessments P ðf Þ for all gambles f in
some set of gambles K LðXÞ, which need not have any predeﬁned structure. Since
these assessments represent commitments of the subject to act in certain ways, they are
subject to a number of rationality requirements. The strongest such requirement that we
shall consider here, is that P should be coherent [10, Deﬁnition 2.5.1]. This is the case if





½fkðxÞ  P ðfkÞ  m½f0ðxÞ  P ðf0Þ
" #
P 0: ð5Þ
Assume that this condition fails for some n;m > 0, f0; . . . ; fn 2K. Then, there would be
some  > 0 such that m½f0  ½P ðf0Þ þ  point-wise dominates the acceptable combination
of buying transactions
Pn
k¼1½fk  PðfkÞ þ , and is therefore acceptable as well.7 This
would mean that by combining acceptable transactions derived from his assessments,
the subject can be eﬀectively forced to buy f0 at the price P ðf0Þ þ , which is strictly higher
than the supremum acceptable buying price P ðf0Þ that he has speciﬁed for it.
It also follows from Eq. (5), for the case where m ¼ 0, that the subject’s assessments
avoid sure loss [10, Deﬁnition 2.4.1]: for any n in the set of positive natural numbers N





½fkðxÞ  P ðfkÞ
" #
P 0:
Otherwise, there would be some  > 0 such that for all x in X:Xn
k¼1
½fkðxÞ  P ðfkÞ þ  6 ;
i.e., the net reward of buying the gambles fk for the acceptable prices P ðfkÞ   is sure to
lead to a loss of at least , whatever the outcome of the experiment!
And ﬁnally, if the coherence condition fails for some n ¼ 0;m > 0; f0 2K, we deduce
that we can raise P ðf0Þ in some positive quantity , contradicting its interpretation as a
supremum acceptable buying price. All of these are inconsistencies that should be avoided.
We list a few interesting consequences of coherence here, as they will turn out useful in
later proofs. Any coherent lower prevision P is monotone: f 6 g ) P ðf Þ 6 P ðgÞ; super-
additive: P ðf þ gÞP P ðf Þ þ P ðgÞ; positively homogeneous: P ðkf Þ ¼ kPðf Þ for all real
kP 0; constant additive: Pðf þ lÞ ¼ P ðf Þ þ l, and also P ðlÞ ¼ l for all real numbers
l; and it satisﬁes P ðf ÞP inf f . (When a gamble appears as an argument of P in the above
expressions, it is of course assumed to be in the domain of P .)7 The underlying assumption, or axiom of rationality, here is that a ﬁnite non-negative linear combination of
acceptable gambles is acceptable. This assumption is closely linked with the linearity of the chosen utility scale.
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point-wise addition of gambles, and the scalar (point-wise) multiplication of gambles with
real numbers, the form of the coherence requirement simpliﬁes considerably. Indeed, then
P is coherent if and only if [10, Section 2.3.3]
1. Pðf ÞP inf f [accepting sure gains; positivity];
2. Pðkf Þ ¼ kP ðf Þ [positive homogeneity];
3. Pðf þ gÞP Pðf Þ þ P ðgÞ [super-additivity]
for all f and g in K and non-negative real k.2.3. Natural extension
A lower prevision P deﬁned on an arbitrary set of gamblesK can, provided it avoids
sure loss, always be corrected to a coherent lower prevision E on the set of all gambles
LðXÞ, through a procedure called natural extension. The natural extension E of P is the
smallest coherent lower prevision onLðXÞ that point-wise dominates P onK. It is given
for all gambles f on X by [10, Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3]








lk½fkðxÞ  P ðfkÞ
" #
: ð6Þ
The natural extension summarises the behavioural implications of the assessments present
in P : Eðf Þ is the supremum buying price for f that can be derived from the lower prevision
P by arguments of coherence alone: we see from its deﬁnition above that it is the supre-
mum of all prices that the subject can be eﬀectively forced to buy the gamble f for, by com-
bining ﬁnite numbers of buying transactions implicit in his lower prevision assessments P .
The concept of natural extension can also be used to characterise the coherence of a
lower prevision P onK: a lower prevision P that avoids sure loss is coherent if and only
if it coincides with its natural extension on its domainK, i.e., if E is indeed an extension of
P . Observe that if P is coherent, then E will not be in general the unique coherent extension
of P toLðXÞ; but any other coherent extension of P will dominate E on all gambles, and
will therefore represent behavioural dispositions not present in P .
We shall see further on in Section 6 that this notion of natural extension can be gener-
alised from the unconditional lower previsions considered here to the conditional lower
previsions to be introduced and studied later. In order to distinguish between the two types
of natural extension, we shall sometimes refer to the present notion as unconditional nat-
ural extension.2.4. In terms of linear previsions
When P ðf Þ ¼ P ðf Þ, the subject’s supremum buying price for the gamble f coincides with
his inﬁmum selling price, and this common value is then a prevision or fair price for the
gamble f, in the sense of de Finetti [6]. When a lower prevision P is deﬁned on a negation
invariant set of gambles K, meaning that K ¼ ff : f 2Kg ¼K, we can deﬁne the
conjugate upper prevision P onK by P ðf Þ ¼ P ðf Þ, f 2K; and we call P self-conjugate
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domain.
We then deﬁne a linear prevision P on the set of all gamblesLðXÞ [10, Section 2.8] as a
self-conjugate coherent lower prevision, or equivalently, as a real-valued linear functional
on LðXÞ that is positive (if f P 0 then P ðf ÞP 0) and has unit norm (PðIXÞ ¼ 1). Its
restriction to events is a ﬁnitely additive probability. Let us denote by PðXÞ the set of
all linear previsions on LðXÞ. A real-valued functional P deﬁned on some domain K is
called a linear prevision if it can be extended to a linear prevision on all gambles.
The notions of avoiding sure loss, coherence, and natural extension can also be charac-
terised in terms of sets of linear previsions. Consider a lower prevision P deﬁned on a set of
gambles K. Its set of dominating linear previsions is given by
MðPÞ :¼ fP 2 PðXÞ : ð8f 2KÞðP ðf ÞP Pðf ÞÞg:
Then P avoids sure loss if and only if MðP Þ 6¼ ;, i.e., if P it has some dominating linear
prevision. P is coherent if and only if Pðf Þ ¼ minfPðf Þ : P 2MðP Þg for all f in K, i.e.,
if P is the lower envelope of MðPÞ. And the natural extension E of P is given by
Eðf Þ ¼ minfP ðf Þ : P 2MðP Þg for all f inLðXÞ. The natural extension of a coherent lower
prevision P can therefore be computed as the lower envelope of the linear previsions that
dominate P on its domain. We deduce from this fact that the procedure of natural exten-
sion is transitive: if we consider the natural extension E1 of P to some domain K1 K
and then the natural extension of E1 to all gambles, this extension will agree with the nat-
ural extension of P to all gambles.
These properties allow us to give coherent lower previsions a Bayesian sensitivity anal-
ysis interpretation, in contrast with the direct behavioural one considered so far: we might
assume the existence of some ideal but unknown linear prevision P modelling the behav-
ioural dispositions of our subject, and model that we know P only imperfectly by stating
that P belongs to some (compact and convex) set M of possible candidate linear previ-
sions. Then this set of (precise) linear previsions is mathematically equivalent to its lower
envelope P , which is a coherent lower prevision, and P 2M is equivalent to P P P .2.5. Conditioning
Let B be a partition of X, i.e., a set of mutually disjoint events whose union is X. Then
we can consider for every B 2 B and any gamble f on X a subject’s conditional lower pre-
vision P ðf j BÞ of f given B, deﬁned as the supremum price he would currently be willing to
pay for f if he came to know subsequently that the outcome of the experiment took a value
in B (and nothing else). Alternatively, it could be deﬁned as the subject’s supremum buying
price for the so-called contingent gamble IBf , which is called-oﬀ when B does not occur.
If we assume that the conditional lower previsions P ð j BÞ are deﬁned on the same
domain H for all B 2 B,8 then we can summarise all these conditional lower previsions
through the mathematical device Pð j BÞ – a two-place function – where for all f 2H
P ðf jBÞ :¼
X
B2B
IBP ðf jBÞ:8 This is no essential restriction; for more details see [10, Section 6.2.4].
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importantly, P ðf jBÞ can be regarded as a gamble on X that is B-measurable, that is, con-
stant on the elements of B: it assumes the value P ðf jBÞ on any x 2 B. We shall frequently
use the notations






IB½f  P ðf jBÞ: ð7Þ
Gðf jBÞ is called the marginal gamble on f contingent on B: it is the gamble that is called-oﬀ
unless B occurs, and where the subject pays the price P ðf jBÞ for f, when B does occur.
Conditional lower previsions P ðjBÞ are also subject to a number of rationality criteria,
which we now turn to.
2.5.1. Separate coherence
The ﬁrst requirement we consider is that of separate coherence:
Deﬁnition 1 [10, Section 6.2.2]. Let PðjBÞ be a conditional lower prevision with domain
H. It is called separately coherent when the following two conditions hold:
(SC1) For each B in B, PðjBÞ is a coherent lower prevision on H.
(SC2) IB 2H and P ðBjBÞ ¼ 1 for each B 2 B.
It is an immediate but rather important consequence of separate coherence that
IBf ¼ IBg ) P ðf jBÞ ¼ P ðgjBÞ ð8Þ
for all gambles f and g in the domain of P ðjBÞ and all B in B; see [10, Lemma 6.2.4]. It
also follows from separate coherence that for any gamble f, there is a linear prevision
PðjBÞ that dominates P ðjBÞ on its domain and satisﬁes P ðf jBÞ ¼ P ðf jBÞ and P ðBjBÞ ¼ 1.
Now if f is a B-measurable gamble, i.e., constant on the elements B of the partition B,
we can write f ¼PB2Bf ðBÞIB, where f ðBÞ denotes the constant value of f on B. So we see
that fIB ¼ f ðBÞIB, and coherence of the lower prevision P ðjBÞ requires for the constant
gamble f ðBÞ that P ðf ðBÞjBÞ ¼ f ðBÞ. It then follows from separate coherence that if the
B-measurable gamble f belongs to the domain of P ðjBÞ, then P ðf jBÞ ¼ f ðBÞ for all
B 2 B, or equivalently, P ðf jBÞ ¼ f .9 We may therefore always assume, without loss of
generality, that the domain of a separately coherent conditional lower prevision PðjBÞ
contains all B-measurable gambles, because for such gambles f the value P ðf jBÞ ¼ f is
uniquely determined by separate coherence. We can go still further. Indeed, choose, for
any B in B, a gamble fB in the domain H, and consider the real-valued map
f ¼PB2BIBfB, which we shall assume to be bounded (a gamble). Then fIB ¼ fBIB, so sep-
arate coherence requires that if f 2H, then P ðf jBÞ ¼ P ðfBjBÞ for all B in B. If f does not
belong to H, then this tells us that we can extend P ðjBÞ uniquely to f, by separate
coherence. We may therefore also always assume, without loss of generality, that the
domain H of P ðjBÞ is B-closed, meaning that if fB 2H for all B 2 B, then ifP
B2BfBIB is bounded, it belongs to H as well.9 It follows from these comments that if we have two separately coherent conditional lower previsions P 1ðjB1Þ
and P 2ðjB2Þ, and a set B belonging to both partitions B1 and B2, then P 1ðBjB1Þ ¼ P 2ðBjB2Þ is equal to IB, the
gamble which takes the value 1 on B and 0 on Bc.
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domain H, then for each B 2 B, we can consider the (unconditional) natural extension
EðjBÞ of the coherent lower prevision PðjBÞ to all gambles, given by








ki½fiðxÞ  P ðfijBÞ
" #
for all gambles f on X. Note that, as we did in Section 2.4, we can deﬁne the set of linear
previsions
MðPðjBÞÞ :¼ fPðjBÞ 2 PðXÞ : ð8f 2HÞðP ðf jBÞP P ðf jBÞÞg:
Then PðjBÞ will be coherent if and only if it is the lower envelope ofMðPðjBÞÞ, and the
natural extension EðjBÞ will be the lower envelope of MðP ðBÞÞ. This leads to a condi-
tional lower prevision EðjBÞ on LðXÞ, called the (unconditional) natural extension of
P ðjBÞ, which clearly is separately coherent as well.
Finally, when the domainH of the conditional lower prevision PðjBÞ is a linear space
that contains all IB, B 2 B, then P ðjBÞ is separately coherent if and only if [10, Theorem
6.2.7]
1. P ðf jBÞP infX2Bf ðxÞ;
2. P ðkf jBÞ ¼ kP ðf jBÞ;
3. P ðf þ gjBÞP Pðf jBÞ þ P ðgjBÞ
for all f and g inH, kP 0, and B 2 B. This should be compared with the characterisation
of coherence near the end of Section 2.2.
2.5.2. Joint coherence
If besides the conditional lower prevision P ðjBÞ we have other coherent conditional or
unconditional lower previsions, we should require, besides separate coherence, that the
assessments of all these (conditional) lower previsions should be consistent with one
another. This leads to the requirement of joint coherence.10 It is easier to formulate it
for the case where we have a ﬁnite number of conditional lower previsions, P 1ðjB1Þ,
. . ., PN ðjBNÞ, since unconditional previsions correspond to the particular case where
B ¼ fXg.
Deﬁnition 2 [10, Deﬁnition 7.1.4]. Let P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjBN Þ be separately coherent
conditional lower previsions with respective linear domainsH1; . . . ;HN LðXÞ.11 They
are called jointly coherent if for any fj 2Hj where j ¼ 1; . . . ;N , and for any i in
f1; . . . ;Ng, f0 2Hi and B0 2 Bi, there is some event B in fB0g [
SN
j¼1SjðfjÞ such that10 This requirement is called simply ‘coherence’ in [10]. We have preferred to use the terminology ‘joint
coherence’ in order to emphasise the distinction with ‘separate coherence’.
11 We assume here that the domains are linear spaces only for the sake of simplicity. Nothing essential changes if





jGðf kj jBjÞ. For more details, see [9].







where the Bj-support Sj(fj) of the gamble fj is deﬁned as the set of events
SjðfjÞ :¼ fBj 2 Bj : IBjfj 6¼ 0g: ð10Þ
Similarly to the condition (5) for the coherence of an unconditional lower prevision, the
condition (9) means that our subject’s supremum acceptable buying price for a gamble f
conditional on B0 cannot be raised by considering the implications of the behavioural dis-
positions expressed through the other assessments.
It follows from the deﬁnition above that if P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjBN Þ are jointly coherent,
then P iðjBiÞ is separately coherent for each i ¼ 1; . . . ;N . If in particular Bi ¼ fXg for
some i (i.e., if we have an unconditional lower prevision), we deduce that P iðjBiÞ is a
coherent lower prevision. Note moreover (and this is one of the things that renders our
task in this paper diﬃcult) that the notion of joint coherence is not transitive: given con-
ditional lower previsions P 1ðjB1Þ, P 2ðjB2Þ and P 3ðjB3Þ, the joint coherence of P 1ðjB1Þ
with P 2ðjB2Þ and of P 2ðjB2Þ with P 3ðjB3Þ does not imply that P 1ðjB1Þ, P 2ðjB2Þ and
P 3ðjB3Þ are jointly coherent.
In the particular case where we only have an unconditional coherent lower prevision P
deﬁned on H1 and a separately coherent conditional lower prevision P ðjBÞ deﬁned on
H2
12, the joint coherence condition (9) simpliﬁes to [10, Section 6.3.2]
sup
x2X
½Gðf Þ þ GðgjBÞ  GðhÞðxÞP 0;
sup
x2X
½Gðf Þ þ GðgjBÞ  GðwjBÞðxÞP 0
for any f ; h 2H1, g;w 2H2 and B 2 B, where similarly to Eq. (7), Gðf Þ : f  P ðf Þ.
It is instructive to look at the special case thatH1 includesH2, so P ðf Þ is deﬁned for all
gambles f for which Pðf jBÞ is deﬁned. Then the coherence conditions above become
P ðGðf jBÞÞP 0; ðCPÞ
P ðGðf jBÞÞ ¼ 0 ðGBRÞ
for all f in H1 and B in B. When both P and P ðjBÞ are linear previsions P and P ðjBÞ,
these conditions turn into Pðf Þ ¼ P ðPðf jBÞÞ and P ðf j BÞP ðBÞ ¼ P ðfIBÞ, respectively.
The second condition is of course Bayes’ Rule, which is why its counterpart (GBR) for
lower previsions is called the Generalised Bayes Rule. This shows that, in the case of linear
previsions, Bayes’ Rule is necessary for coherence, but not suﬃcient in general, because the
ﬁrst condition, which is the Conglomerative Property (see Section 1), also has to hold. In
this respect, Walley’s approach to coherence is even more demanding than de Finetti’s [6]
(or Williams’ [11]), because de Finetti speciﬁcally does not require the Conglomerative
Property to hold when the partition B is inﬁnite.12 There are some additional technical and essentially unrestrictive requirements on the domainsH1 andH2;
see [10, Section 6.3.1] for more details.
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P ðP ðf jBÞÞP Pðf ÞP P ðP ðf jBÞÞ; ð11Þ
which is, of course, a necessary condition for joint coherence. When, in particular, P ðjBÞ
is a conditional linear prevision P ðjBÞ, these inequalities turn into the equality
P ðf Þ ¼ P ðP ðf jBÞÞ.
2.6. The marginal extension theorem
To complete this introduction to coherent lower previsions, we turn to the precise for-
mulation of Walley’s Marginal Extension Theorem, already mentioned in Section 1.
Consider a separately coherent conditional lower prevision P ðjBÞ deﬁned on a set of
gambles H LðXÞ, as well as a coherent unconditional lower prevision P deﬁned on
another set of gamblesK LðXÞ. Assume in addition, and this is crucial, thatK consists
only of gambles that are B-measurable, i.e., constant on the elements of the partition B.
Now consider the (unconditional) natural extension E of P to the set of all B-measur-
able gambles, and for each B in B, denote by MðjBÞ the (unconditional) natural extension
of the coherent lower prevision P ðjBÞ to the set of all gamblesLðXÞ. This leads to a new,
separately coherent, conditional lower prevision MðjBÞ.
Interestingly and surprisingly, when all elements ofK are B-measurable, requiring the
separate coherence of P and PðjBÞ is enough to guarantee that they are also jointly coher-
ent. The (unconditional) natural extensions E and MðjBÞ also have a part in characteris-
ing their jointly coherent extensions, as the following theorem states. For a remarkably
simple proof, we refer to [10, Section 6.7.2].
Theorem 1 (Marginal Extension Theorem). Suppose that (i) P is a coherent lower prevision
on a domainK where (ii) all gambles inK are B-measurable, and (iii) P ðjBÞ is separately
coherent conditional lower prevision on an arbitrary domain H. Then
1. P and P ðjBÞ are jointly coherent, and they have jointly coherent extensions to all of
LðXÞ;
2. The point-wise smallest jointly coherent extensions of P and PðjBÞ to LðXÞ are M and
MðjBÞ where M is the lower prevision defined by
Mðf Þ ¼ EðMðf jBÞÞ:
The marginal extension M is not necessarily equal to the (unconditional) natural exten-
sion E of P alone, as it also has to take into account the behavioural consequences of the
assessments that are present in P ðjBÞ! But since it follows from separate coherence that
for any B-measurable gamble f, Mðf jBÞ ¼ f , we see that M and E coincide at least on
all B-measurable gambles.
In general,M will not be the only extension of P that is jointly coherent with P ðjBÞ; but
any other coherent extension will dominateM and will therefore represent behavioural dis-
positions not present in P and P ðjBÞ.
Finally, observe that for M and MðjBÞ, the equality is reached in the second of the
inequalities (11), because, as we have seen above, M and E coincide onB-measurable gam-
bles such as Mðf jBÞ. These inequalities also tell us that the extension Mðf Þ is uniquely
jointly coherent whenever P ðf jBÞ ¼ P ðf jBÞ is precise and belongs to K. In particular,
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able gambles, this tells us that P and P ðjBÞ have unique jointly coherent extensions
M ¼ P ðP ðjBÞÞ and MðjBÞ ¼ P ðjBÞ to all gambles.
The idea behind the requirement of B-measurability for the gambles in K is to have
some sort of ‘concatenation’, or hierarchy, in the model. That is, we have some marginal
information about the occurrence of the elements of the partition B, in the form of a
coherent lower prevision P deﬁned only on B-measurable gambles, and a lower prevision
PðjBÞ conditional on B. The marginal extension theorem allows us to combine these two
lower previsions into a least committal jointly coherent pair M , MðjBÞ.
It is perhaps easier to see this if we reformulate the Marginal Extension Theorem in
terms of random variables, i.e., the way it is discussed in Section 1. Consider two random
variables X1 and X2 taking values in the respective sets X1 and X2. We may consider an
unconditional (marginal) lower prevision P 1 onH1 LðX1Þ, modelling our information
about X1 and a conditional lower prevision P 2ðjX 1Þ on H2 LðX2Þ modelling beliefs
about the value of X2 conditional on what value X1 assumes.
If we let X ¼ X1 X2, then we can identify any gamble on X1 with a gamble on X that
only depends on the ﬁrst coordinate x1 in X ¼ ðx1; x2Þ, i.e., which is X1-variable. If we con-
sider the partitionB ¼ ffx1g X2 : x1 2 X1g of X, then we see that we can identify P 1 with
a lower prevision P on gambles on X that are B-measurable, and its natural extension E to
all B-measurable gambles can be identiﬁed with the natural extension E1 of P 1 toLðX1Þ.
Similarly, we can associate the statement ‘X 1 ¼ x1’ with the element fx1g X2 of the
partition B. We can therefore identify the conditional lower prevision P 2ðjX 1Þ with a con-
ditional lower prevision P ðjBÞ deﬁned on a set of gambles on X, and the natural extension
MðjBÞ can be identiﬁed with the natural extension E2ðjX 1Þ of P 2ðjX 1Þ. Indeed, it can be
shown (see Lemma 6 further on) that
Mðhjfx1g X2Þ ¼ E2ðhðx1; Þ j x1Þ
for all gambles h on X and all x1 in X, where E2ðjx1Þ is the natural extension toLðX2Þ of
the coherent lower prevision P 2ðjx1Þ. So the Marginal Extension Theorem tells us, as we
already essentially announced in Section 1, that the point-wise smallest jointly coherent
extensions of P 1 and P 2ðjX 1Þ to all gambles on X1 X2 are given by M ¼ E1ðE2ðjX 1ÞÞ
and E2ðjX 1Þ. M models the ‘information’ about the value that the joint random variable
ðX 1;X 2Þ assumes in X1 X2. MðhÞ ¼ E1ðE2ðhjX 1ÞÞ is the smallest (most conservative)
supremum acceptable buying price for a gamble h on X1 X2 that can be derived from
P 1 and P 2ðjX 1Þ using (only) coherence.
In the rest of this paper, we shall generalise these results to a more general setting. But
before we start doing that, it will be convenient to derive a number of (new) additional
results about coherent conditioning.
2.7. Further properties of coherent conditional lower previsions
The ﬁrst result deals with the notion of separate coherence, and tells us that, unsurpris-
ingly, it leads to conditions very similar to the coherence condition (5) for unconditional
previsions, but with a suitably restricted supremum.
Proposition 1. Let B be a partition of X, and consider a conditional lower prevision P ðjBÞ
defined on a set of gamblesH that is B-closed and contains all B-measurable gambles. Then





½fkðxÞ  P ðfkjBÞ  m½f0ðxÞ  P ðf0jBÞ
" #
P 0: ð12ÞProof. First, assume that PðjBÞ is separately coherent. Fix natural numbers m and n, an
element B of B, as well as gambles f0; f1; . . . ; fn inH. Note that we may assume without
loss of generality that n > 0: when n ¼ 0, the separate coherence of P ðjBÞ implies that
P ðf0jBÞP infX2Bf0ðXÞ, and Eq. (12) holds. Consider the gambles g0 :¼ f0IB and
gk :¼ fkIB  lIBc for k ¼ 1; . . . ; n, where l is an arbitrary real number, and Bc the set-the-
oretic complement of B. SinceH is assumed to be B-closed, all these gambles belong to
H. Since moreover IBgk ¼ IBfk, it follows from (8) that P ðfkjBÞ ¼ PðgkjBÞ, for






½fkðxÞ  PðfkjBÞ  m½f0ðxÞ  P ðf0jBÞ
" #











½gkðxÞ  PðgkjBÞ  m½g0ðxÞ  Pðg0jBÞ
" #







then the desired inequality indeed follows.
To prove the converse implication, consider any B in B. Then we must show that P ðjBÞ
is a coherent lower prevision onH, and that P ðBjBÞ ¼ 1 (recall that IB is B-measurable,
and therefore belongs toH.) It follows from the condition (12) that for all n;mP 0 and










½fkðxÞ  P ðfkjBÞ  m½f0ðxÞ  P ðf0jBÞ
" #
P 0;
so PðjBÞ is indeed coherent. To prove that P ðBjBÞ ¼ 1, let n ¼ 1, f0 ¼ f1 ¼ IB and m arbi-
trary, and apply (12) to ﬁnd that ð1 mÞP ð1 mÞP ðBjBÞ. Choosing m ¼ 0 and m ¼ 2
leads to the desired equality. h
The second result is a generalisation of the coherence condition (CP) and (one of) the
inequalities (11).
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13 than B1, and let
P 1ðjB1Þ and P 2ðjB2Þ be two separately coherent conditional lower previsions defined on
LðXÞ that are also jointly coherent. Then for any gamble f on X, P 1ðGðf jB2ÞjB1ÞP 0 and
P 1ðf jB1ÞP P 1ðP 2ðf jB2ÞjB1Þ.Proof. Consider f in LðXÞ and B1 in B1. Let g ¼ IB1f and h ¼ Gðf jB2Þ. Then the joint
coherence of P 1ðjB1Þ and P 2ðjB2Þ implies in particular that there is some B in
fB1g [ S2ðgÞ such that
0 6 sup
x2B
Gð0jB1Þ þ GðgjB2ÞðxÞ  GðhjB1ÞðxÞ½ 
¼ sup
x2B
GðIB1f jB2ÞðxÞ  IB1ðxÞ½Gðf jB2ÞðxÞ  P 1ðGðf jB2ÞjB1Þ½ :
Now we take into account that any element of S2ðgÞ is included in B1, since g is zero out-
side B1. This means that the supremum over any B in fB1g [ S2ðgÞ is dominated by the
supremum over B1, which leads to
0 6 sup
x2B1
GðIB1f jB2ÞðxÞ  ½Gðf jB2ÞðxÞ  P 1ðGðf jB2ÞjB1Þ½ 
¼ P 1ðGðf jB2ÞjB1Þ þ sup
x2B1
½GðIB1f jB2ÞðxÞ  Gðf jB2ÞðxÞ




IB2ðxÞ½IB1ðxÞf ðxÞ  f ðxÞ þ P 2ðf jB2Þ  P 2ðIB1f jB2Þ
¼ P 1ðGðf jB2ÞjB1Þ ¼ P 1ðf  P 2ðf jB2ÞjB1Þ;
where the third equality holds because either B2  B1 or B1 \ B2 ¼ ;, and if B2  B1 then
IB1 IB2 ¼ IB2 and IB2ðIB1f Þ ¼ IB2f , so the separate coherence of P 2ðjB2Þ ensures that
P 2ðIB1f jB2Þ ¼ P 2ðf jB2Þ; see (8). Since this holds for all B1 in B1, we see that, indeed,
P 1ðGðf jB2ÞjB1ÞP 0.
Now the coherence of the lower prevision P 1ðjB1Þ implies thatP 1ðf  P ðf jB2ÞjB1Þ 6 P 1ðf jB1Þ þ P 1ðP 2ðf jB2ÞjB1Þ ¼ P 1ðf jB1Þ  P 1ðP 2ðf jB2ÞjB1Þ;
whence P 1ðf jB1ÞP P 2ðP ðf jB2ÞjB1Þ. Since this holds for all B1 in B1, we indeed get
P 1ðf jB1ÞP P 1ðP 2ðf jB2ÞjB1Þ. h3. The marginal extension theorem
We now proceed to formulate and prove our generalised version of the Marginal Exten-
sion Theorem.
Let us consider N > 0 partitions B1; . . . ;BN of X that are increasingly ﬁner, i.e., Biþ1 is
ﬁner than Bi for i ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1. For each partition Bi, we consider a separately coherent
conditional lower prevision P iðjBiÞ, deﬁned on a set of gamblesHi LðXÞ. We make the
13 This means that the elements of B1 are unions of elements of B2.
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the elements of Biþ1, for i ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1. Then P iðjBiÞ can be regarded as ‘marginal
information’ about the occurrence of the elements of Biþ1.
In turns out that the separate coherence of these conditional lower previsions is enough
to guarantee that they are also jointly coherent, and that they have jointly coherent exten-
sions to all of LðXÞ. We characterise the smallest such extensions in the following theo-
rem. Note that it extends Walley’s Marginal Extension Theorem even in the case that
N ¼ 2, because we do not require that one of the lower previsions should be an uncondi-
tional one. Our proof (and in particular Lemma 3, which contains the crux of the argu-
ment) is inspired by ideas ﬁrst expressed by De Cooman and Zaﬀalon in [4].
Theorem 2 (Marginal Extension Theorem; general version for partitions). Let
P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjBN Þ be separately coherent lower previsions with respective domains
H1; . . . ;HN . Assume that, for any i ¼ 2; . . . ;N , the partition Bi is finer than Bi1, and that
moreover any gamble in Hi1 is Bi-measurable. Then
1. P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjBN Þ are jointly coherent and they have separately and jointly coherent
extensions to all of LðXÞ;
2. the point-wise smallest separately and jointly coherent extensions are
M1ðjB1Þ; . . . ;MNðjBNÞ, where
MiðjBiÞ ¼ EiðEiþ1ð   ðENðjBNÞÞ    jBiþ1ÞjBiÞ; ð13Þ
where for each BN in BN , ENðjBN Þ is the (unconditional) natural extension of PN ðjBNÞ to
LðXÞ and for each Bj in Bj, j ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1, EjðjBjÞ is the (unconditional) natural exten-
sion of P jðjBjÞ to the set of all Bjþ1-measurable gambles.
Before proving the theorem, we wish to point out that the so-called marginal extensions
MiðjBiÞ can be obtained using the following ‘backward’ recursion formula
MiðjBiÞ ¼ EiðMiþ1ðjBiþ1ÞjBiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1 ð14Þ
with ‘initial condition’
MNðjBNÞ ¼ EN ðjBN Þ: ð15ÞProof. For any i ¼ 1; . . . ;N , EiðjBiÞ is the (unconditional) natural extension of the
separately coherent lower prevision P iðjBiÞ, and is therefore also separately coherent.
Then, we prove in Lemma 1 that the conditional lower previsions MiðjBiÞ are separately
coherent, and in Lemma 3 that they are jointly coherent. In Lemma 2, we show that
MiðjBiÞ extends P iðjBiÞ to LðXÞ for all i ¼ 1; . . . ;N , which shows that the latter indeed
have separately and jointly coherent extensions to LðXÞ, and are therefore also jointly
coherent. Finally, in Lemma 4 we show that the MiðjBiÞ are the smallest jointly coherent
extensions. hLemma 1. The conditional lower previsions MiðjBiÞ are separately coherent, for
i ¼ 1; . . . ;N .
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MN ðjBN Þ ¼ EN ðjBN Þ is separately coherent. We complete the proof by showing that if
Miþ1ðjBiþ1Þ is separately coherent, then so is MiðjBiÞ, for i ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1.
We shall verify that MiðjBiÞ satisﬁes the separate coherence axioms we mentioned in
Section 2.5 for conditional lower previsions with linear domains. First of all, using Eq.
(14), we get for any f in LðXÞ and any Bi in Bi,
Miðf jBiÞ ¼ EiðMiþ1ðf jBiþ1ÞjBiÞP inf
x2Bi







f ðxÞ ¼ inf
x2Bi
f ðxÞ;
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the separate coherence of EiðjBiÞ, the second
inequality from the separate coherence of Miþ1ðjBiþ1Þ [induction hypothesis], and where
we have also used the fact that the partitions are increasingly ﬁner.
Next, for any f inLðXÞ and kP 0, we have, using Eq. (14) and the separate coherence
of Miþ1ðjBiþ1Þ [induction hypothesis] and EiðjBiÞ,
Miðkf jBiÞ ¼ EiðMiþ1ðkf jBiþ1ÞjBiÞ
¼ EiðkMiþ1ðf jBiþ1ÞjBiÞ
¼ kEiðMiþ1ðf jBiþ1ÞjBiÞ ¼ kMiðf jBiÞ:
Finally, given any f and g inLðXÞ, we have, again using Eq. (14) and the separate coher-
ence of Miþ1ðjBiþ1Þ [induction hypothesis] and EiðjBiÞ,
Miðf þ gjBiÞ ¼ EiðMiþ1ðf þ gjBiþ1ÞjBiÞ
P EiðMiþ1ðf jBiþ1Þ þMiþ1ðgjBiþ1ÞjBiÞ
P EiðMiþ1ðf jBiþ1ÞjBiÞ þ EiðMiþ1ðgjBiþ1ÞjBiÞ
¼ Miðf jBiÞ þMiðgjBiÞ: Lemma 2. MiðjBiÞ is an extension of P iðjBiÞ, for i ¼ 1; . . . ;N .Proof. For f 2HN we have MN ðf jBN Þ ¼ EN ðf jBN Þ ¼ PN ðf jBN Þ, because PN ðjBN Þ is
separately coherent and therefore coincides with its natural extension on its domain. Next,
consider f 2Hi for some 1 6 i < N . Then f is Biþ1-measurable, and, since Miþ1ðjBiþ1Þ is
separately coherent, it follows [see Section 2.5] thatMiþ1ðf jBiþ1Þ ¼ f . Hence, we get, using
Eq. (14), that
Miðf jBiÞ ¼ EiðMiþ1ðf jBiþ1ÞjBiÞ ¼ Eiðf jBiÞ ¼ P iðf jBiÞ;
where the last equality follows because P iðjBiÞ is separately coherent and therefore coin-
cides with its natural extension on its domain Hi. hLemma 3. The conditional lower previsions M1ðjB1Þ; . . . ;MN ðjBN Þ are jointly coherent.Proof. Fix arbitrary f0; f1; . . . ; fN inLðXÞ, i in f1; . . . ;Ng and Bi 2 Bi. We must show that
there is some event B in fBig [
SN
j¼1SjðfjÞ such that







Let us introduce the notations g :¼PNj¼1GðfjjBjÞ  Gðf0jBiÞ, h‘j :¼ M ‘ðfjjB‘Þ for
‘ ¼ j; . . . ;N and hNþ1j :¼ fj for j ¼ 0; . . . ;N . Since IBi ½f0Miðf0jBiÞ ¼ IBi ½f0Miðf0jBiÞ,




½fj MjðfjjBjÞ  IBi ½f0 Miðf0jBiÞ ¼
XN
j¼1






½h‘þ1j  h‘j  IBi
XN
‘¼i













½h‘þ1j  h‘j  IBi ½h‘þ10  h‘0 if ‘P i;
P‘
j¼1
½h‘þ1j  h‘j otherwise;
8>><>>:
then, clearly, g ¼PN‘¼1g‘. Also observe that for any ‘ ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1, the gamble g‘ is




We shall distinguish between three possible cases. The ﬁrst one is that i 6 ‘ < N . Then we





















½M ‘þ1ðfjjB‘þ1ÞðxÞ M ‘ðfjjC‘Þ





½M ‘þ1ðfjjB‘þ1ÞðxÞ  E‘ðM ‘þ1ðfjjB‘þ1ÞjC‘Þ
 IBiðxÞ½M ‘þ1ðf0jB‘þ1ÞðxÞ  E‘ðM ‘þ1ðf0jB‘þ1ÞjC‘Þ
P 0;
where the last inequality follows from the separate coherence of E‘ðjB‘Þ, Proposition 1,
and the fact that either C‘  Bi or C‘ \ Bi ¼ ;.
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sup
x2CN




½fjðxÞ  EN ðfjjCNÞ  IBiðxÞ½f0ðxÞ  ENðf0jCN Þ
" #
P 0;
again taking into account that EN ðjBN Þ is separately coherent, Proposition 1, and the fact
that either CN  Bi or CN \ Bi ¼ ;.












½M ‘þ1ðfjjB‘þ1ÞðxÞ  E‘ðM ‘þ1ðfjjB‘þ1ÞjC‘ÞP 0;
where the last inequality follows yet again from the separate coherence of the lower pre-
vision E‘ðjB‘Þ and Proposition 1. This proves that the inequality (17) indeed holds.





for ‘ ¼ 1; . . . ;N and for all C‘ 2 B‘. We give a proof by induction. Recall that g‘ is
B‘þ1-measurable for all ‘ ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1, and denote by g‘ðC‘þ1Þ the constant value that
g‘ attains on the element C‘þ1 of the partitionB‘þ1. It is obvious by applying the inequality
(17) for ‘ ¼ N that the desired inequality (18) holds for ‘ ¼ N . Assume now that the equal-

























where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the second by apply-
ing the inequality (17) for ‘ ¼ n 1. This proves that the desired inequality (18) also holds
for ‘ ¼ n 1, and consequently it holds for all ‘ ¼ 1; . . . ;N .
We are now ready to prove joint coherence. Let j be the smallest integer such that
fj 6¼ 0. Then, h‘j ¼ 0 for all k ¼ 1; . . . ; j 1; ‘P k, whence gk ¼ 0 for all k < minfj; ig and
g ¼Pnk¼minfj;iggk. If j 6 i, we consider Dj 2 SjðfjÞ. If we invoke the inequality (18) for








On the other hand, if j > i, we may again invoke the inequality (18) for ‘ ¼ i and C‘ ¼ Bi
to ﬁnd that







In any of the two cases, there is some B in fBig [
SN
j¼1SjðfjÞ such that (16) holds, and we
conclude that the conditional lower previsions M1ðjB1Þ; . . . ;MN ðjBN Þ are indeed jointly
coherent. hLemma 4. M1ðjB1Þ, . . ., MN ðjBN Þ are the smallest jointly coherent extensions of the lower
previsions P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjBN Þ.Proof. We give a proof by induction on N. We ﬁrst show that the result holds for N ¼ 2.
We deduce from Lemmas 1–3 that the separately coherent conditional lower previsions
M1ðjB1Þ and M2ðjB2Þ are jointly coherent extensions of P 1ðjB1Þ and P 2ðjB2Þ to
LðXÞ, respectively. Consider two other separately and jointly coherent extensions
M 01ðjB1Þ and M 02ðjB2Þ, and any gamble f on X. Then taking into account that, by con-
struction, M2ðf jB2Þ ¼ E2ðf jB2Þ, it is clear that M 02ðf jB2ÞP M2ðf jB2Þ, because for each
B2 in B2, the coherent lower prevision M 02ðjB2Þ is an extension to LðXÞ of the coherent
lower prevision P 2ðjB2Þ and it therefore dominates its (unconditional) natural extension
E2ðjB2Þ of P 2ðjB2Þ to all gambles. At the same time,
M 01ðf jB1ÞP M 01ðM 02ðf jB2ÞjB1ÞP E1ðM 02ðf jB2ÞjB1ÞP E1ðE2ðf jB2ÞjB1Þ
¼ M1ðf jB1Þ;
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Proposition 2, and the second inequality holds be-
cause M 02ðjB2Þ is B2-measurable and M 01ðjB1Þ is a coherent extension of P 1ðjB1Þ, which
therefore dominates the smallest coherent extension E1ðjB1Þ of P 1ðjB1Þ to B2-measurable
gambles. Hence M1ðjB1Þ and M2ðjB2Þ are the smallest jointly coherent extensions.
We now prove the result for N > 2. Let us introduce the notations
Mni ðjBiÞ ¼ EiðEiþ1ð   ðEnðjBnÞÞ    jBiþ1ÞjBiÞ
for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n and nP 1. Then the induction hypothesis, namely that the result holds for
N ¼ n 1, amounts to stating that the separately coherent conditional lower previsions
Mn11 ðjB1Þ; . . . ;Mn1n1ðjBn1Þ are the smallest jointly coherent extensions of
P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; Pn1ðjBn1Þ to LðXÞ. We want to prove that the result holds for N ¼ n. It
is easy to see that Mni ðf jBiÞ ¼ Mn1i ðEnðf jBnÞjBiÞ for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n 1 and all f in LðXÞ.
Now, given other jointly coherent extensions M 01ðjB1Þ; . . . ;M 0nðjBnÞ of
P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PnðjBnÞ to LðXÞ, we have by a similar course of reasoning as above that
M 0nðf jBnÞP Enðf jBnÞ ¼ Mnnðf jBnÞ for any f 2LðXÞ, and moreover for any i 2 f1; . . . ;
n 1g,
M 0iðf jBiÞP M 0iðM 0nðf jBnÞjBiÞP M 0iðEnðf jBnÞjBiÞ;
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Proposition 2. Now,M 01ðjB1Þ; . . . ;M 0n1ðjBn1Þ are
also jointly coherent extensions of P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; Pn1ðjBn1Þ and they therefore dominate
the smallest jointly coherent extensions, which by the induction hypothesis are
Mn11 ðjB1Þ; . . . ;Mn1n1ðjBn1Þ. Hence,
M 0iðEnðf jBnÞjBiÞP Mn1i ðEnðf jBnÞjBiÞ ¼ Mni ðf jBiÞ:
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indeed the smallest jointly coherent extensions of P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjBN Þ. h
As was the case with Theorem 1, our version of the Marginal Extension Theorem states
that, if we want to combine all these conditional lower previsions and extend them in a
coherent way to LðXÞ, we must use a two-step procedure: ﬁrst, we must extend the mar-
ginal information P i1ðjBi1Þ about each partition Bi to the set of all Bi-measurable gam-
bles, using (unconditional) natural extension; and secondly, we must concatenate this
marginal information by means of Eq. (13).
4. The marginal extension theorem in terms of sets of linear previsions
The marginal extensions can also be calculated as lower envelopes of jointly coherent
conditional linear previsions, obtained by applying the Marginal Extension Theorem to
the conditional linear previsions in the sets
MðPkðjBkÞÞ :¼ fPkðjBkÞ : ð8Bk 2 BkÞðPkðjBkÞ 2MðPðjBkÞÞÞg:
This is proven in the following theorem, which is a generalisation of Theorem 6.7.4 in [10].
Theorem 3 (Lower envelope theorem). Let P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjBN Þ be separately coherent
lower previsions with respective domainsH1; . . . ;HN . Assume that, for any i ¼ 2; . . . ;N , the
partition Bi is finer than Bi1, and that moreover any gamble inHi1 is Bi-measurable. For
any 1 6 k 6 N and any Bk 2 Bk, let PkðjBkÞ be any element ofMðPkðjBkÞÞ. Define, for any
gamble f on X, Pkðf jBkÞ as the Bk-measurable gamble that assumes the value Pkðf jBkÞ on Bk.
Let, for any gamble f on X,
Mkðf jBkÞ ¼ PkðPkþ1ð   ðPN ðf jBN ÞÞ    jBkþ1ÞjBkÞ
for k ¼ 1; . . . ;N . Then the marginal extensions MkðjBkÞ constructed in this way are jointly
(and separately) coherent conditional (linear) previsions onLðXÞ. Moreover, MkðjBkÞ is the
lower envelope of all such conditional linear previsions MkðjBkÞ, and for any gamble f on X
there is such a conditional linear prevision that coincides on f with MkðjBkÞ.Proof. It is easy to see that the MkðjBkÞ are (separately coherent) conditional linear pre-
visions, and they are jointly coherent by the Marginal Extension Theorem (Theorem 2), so
we concentrate on the rest of the proof. We shall prove the result for M1ðjB1Þ, since the
proof we give essentially contains the proofs for MkðjBkÞ for any k ¼ 2; . . . ;N . Consider
any such M1ðjB1Þ. Then, for any gamble f on X and any BN in BN we have that
PN ðf jBN ÞP EN ðf jBN Þ;
since by construction PN ðjBN Þ belongs to MðPN ðjBNÞÞ. Therefore,
MN ðf jBN Þ ¼ PNðf jBN ÞP EN ðf jBN Þ ¼ MN ðf jBNÞ:
Consequently, for any BN1 in BN1 we get in a similar way that
PN1ðPN ðf jBNÞjBN1ÞP EN1ðEN ðf jBN ÞjBN1Þ;
whence
MN1ðf jBN1Þ ¼ PN1ðPN ðf jBN ÞjBN1ÞP EN1ðENðf jBN ÞjBN1Þ ¼ MN1ðf jBN1Þ:
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M1ðf jB1Þ ¼ P 1ð. . . ðPN1ðPN ðf jBNÞjBN1ÞÞ . . . jB1Þ
P E1ð. . . ðEN1ðEN ðf jBN ÞjBN1ÞÞ . . . jB1Þ ¼ M1ðf jB1Þ;
also using Eq. (13). This proves that M1ðjB1Þ dominates M1ðjB1Þ.
To complete the proof, ﬁx a gamble f on X. Then we know that for any BN in BN , there
is some QBN ðjBN Þ inMðPN ðjBN ÞÞ such that [see the discussion of (unconditional) natural
extension in Section 2.5]
QBN ðf jBN Þ ¼ EN ðf jBN Þ:
This can be done for all BN in BN and we can use this to deﬁne a conditional linear pre-
vision QN ðjBN Þ in MðPN ðjBN ÞÞ that satisﬁes, by construction,
QN ðf jBN Þ ¼ ENðf jBN Þ: ð19Þ
Now EN ðf jBNÞ is a BN -measurable gamble, and we know that for any BN1 in BN1, there
is some QBN1ðjBN1Þ in MðPN1ðjBN1ÞÞ such that
QBN1ðEN ðf jBN ÞjBN1Þ ¼ EN1ðEN ðf jBN ÞjBN1Þ:
This can be done for all BN1 in BN1 and we can use this to deﬁne a conditional linear
prevision QN1ðjBN1Þ in MðPN1ðjBN1ÞÞ that satisﬁes, by construction,
QN1ðEN ðf jBN ÞjBN1Þ ¼ EN1ðEN ðf jBNÞjBN1Þ;
and using Eq. (19), this leads to
QN1ðQN ðf jBNÞjBN1Þ ¼ EN1ðEN ðf jBN ÞjBN1Þ ¼ MN1ðf jBN1Þ:
If we follow this process, we eventually obtain a conditional linear prevision Q1ðjB1Þ in
MðP 1ðjB1ÞÞ in the way described above, such that
Q1ð   ðQN1ðQN ðf jBN ÞjBN1ÞÞ    jB1Þ ¼ E1ð   ðEN1ðENðf jBN ÞjBN1ÞÞ    jB1Þ
¼ M1ðf jB1Þ: 
This theorem allows us to give our Marginal Extension Theorem a sensitivity analysis
interpretation: we might assume the existence of precise (but unknown) conditional linear
previsions QkðjBkÞ, and we may model the ‘available information’ about QkðjBkÞ using
the separately coherent conditional lower previsions PkðjBkÞ, or equivalently, by a set
of candidate conditional linear previsions MðPkðjBkÞÞ. Then the combination of these
separate pieces of information should be done by selecting candidate conditional linear
previsions PkðjBkÞ in these sets, and combining them using marginal extension (Bayes’
rule). This leads to sets of jointly coherent marginal extensions, whose lower envelopes
are precisely the marginal extensions of the conditional lower previsions PkðjBkÞ, as
Theorem 3 guarantees.
It is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3 that in the particular case where we have
linear marginals PkðjBkÞ deﬁned on the classes of all Bkþ1-measurable gambles,
k ¼ 1; . . . ;N , the marginal extensions are their unique coherent extensions to LðXÞ. This
can also be seen using Theorem 2: the marginal extensions are simultaneously the smallest
and the largest coherent extensions, and they are therefore unique. Note that in the general
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extensions, but there can be other coherent extensions of P 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; PkðjBkÞ to LðXÞ.
Finally, let us remark that Theorem 3 still holds if we replace in the setsMðPkðjBkÞÞ by
their sets of extreme points, because for any gamble f on X the value Pkðf jBkÞ is attained
on one of the extreme points of MðPkðjBkÞÞ. As a consequence, we deduce that the
extreme points of M1ðjB1Þ are concatenations of extreme points of PkðjBkÞ for
k ¼ 1; . . . ;N , in the manner described in the theorem.
We also deduce from this theorem that the marginal extension theorem we have proven
can be seen as a ﬁnite number of iterations of the marginal extension theorem for two par-
titions. To see this more clearly, assume for instance that N ¼ 3. If we consider M32ðjB2Þ
the marginal extension of the conditional lower previsions P 2ðjB2Þ and P 3ðjB3Þ and then
the marginal extension of P 1ðjB1Þ and M32ðjB2Þ, we obtain again the marginal extension
M3ðjB3Þ of P 1ðjB1Þ; P 2ðjB2Þ and P 3ðjB3Þ. It suﬃces to see that the linear previsions that
dominate M3ðjB3Þ are precisely the combinations of the linear previsions that dominate
P 1ðjB1Þ and those that dominateM32ðjB2Þ. In particular, when one of the lower previsions
is unconditional, the marginal extension can be seen as a ﬁnite replication of Walley’s mar-
ginal extension theorem.
5. The marginal extension theorem in terms of random variables
The Marginal Extension Theorem we have just proven can perhaps be better under-
stood if we consider a sequence of random variables instead of a sequence of increasingly
ﬁner partitions. Let X 1; . . . ;XN be N > 0 random variables taking values in the respective
non-empty sets X1; . . . ;XN . We could interpret the index k of the random variable Xk as a
‘time’, in which case it seems natural to consider the case where we observe the values of
X 1; . . . ;X k, and use these observations to infer something about the as yet unobserved
random variables X kþ1; . . . ;XN . This is the general problem of predictive inference.
In order to be able to study this problem in more detail, let us introduce the following
deﬁnition.










Now let us consider the special case that our subject models his beliefs about the value of
the kth random variable X k conditional on the observation ðx1; . . . ; xk1Þ of the previous
k  1 variables X1, . . ., X k1 in the form of a coherent lower prevision on some subset
Hk of LðXkÞ, which we denote as Pkðjx1; . . . ; xk1Þ. Suppose he does this for all
ðx1; . . . ; xk1Þ in Xk1 (and all k ¼ 1; . . . ;N ).14 Also suppose that the domain of
14 Actually, there is some abuse of notation here, as for k ¼ 1, no observation has yet been made, and we denote
the corresponding (unconditional) coherent lower prevision by P 1.
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tion, that each domain Hk contains all constant gambles k on Xk, and that
Pkðkjx1; . . . ; xk1Þ ¼ k for all k 2 R. We can always make such an assumption without loss
of generality, because coherence requires that no other value than k can be assigned to
Pkðkjx1; . . . ; xk1Þ, and assigning such a value does not aﬀect the coherence in any way.
This simple cosmetic trick will make life much easier for us further on, however.
We then construct the ‘conditional lower prevision’ PkðjX k1Þ as a two-place function
that summarises the available assessments as follows: for any gamble fk inHk, PkðfkjX k1Þ
is a gamble on Xk1 that assumes the value Pkðfkjx1; . . . ; xk1Þ in any element ðx1; . . . ; xk1Þ
of Xk1. We should be careful, however, in using the term ‘conditional lower prevision’ for
PkðfkjX k1Þ, because so far, we have only deﬁned conditional lower previsions with respect
to partitions. We can, however, easily reinterpret PkðfkjX k1Þ as a conditional lower previ-
sion, as we next proceed to show. We ﬁrst make suitable transformations on the domains.
For this, we introduce the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4. Take I  f1; . . . ;Ng. Then, a gamble f 2 XN is called XI -variable when for
every x; y 2 XN such that xi ¼ yi for all i 2 I , we have that f ðxÞ ¼ f ðyÞ.Step 1: There is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of gambles on XN whichQ
are XI -variable and the gambles on i2IXi. In particular, a gamble fk on Xk
can be uniquely associated with a Xk-variable gamble f^ k on X
N , given by
f^ kðx1; . . . ; xNÞ ¼ fkðxkÞ for all ðx1; . . . ; xN Þ 2 XN . Let us deﬁnecHk :¼ ff^ k : fk 2Hkg LðXNÞ for all k ¼ 1; . . . ;N .
Step 2: Next, we deﬁne suitable partitions for our purposes. For any k ¼ 2; . . . ;N and
any ðx1; . . . ; xk1Þ, let us deﬁne the set Bðx1;...;xk1Þ :¼ fðx1; . . . ; xk1Þg  N‘¼kX‘.
Consider the partitions of XN given by B1 ¼ fXNg, Bk :¼ fBz : z 2 Xk1g, for
k ¼ 2; . . . ;N , and BNþ1 :¼ ffðx1; . . . ; xNÞg : ðx1; . . . ; xN Þ 2 XNg.
Step 3: We deﬁne a conditional lower prevision bP kðjBkÞ on dHk bybP kðf^ kjBðx1;...;xk1ÞÞ :¼ Pkðfkjx1; . . . ; xk1Þ
for all fk 2Hk and ðx1; . . . ; xk1Þ 2 Xk1. This lower prevision is only deﬁned on
some Xk-variable gambles. But since we want bP kðjBkÞ to be separately coherent,
we are going to use some of the consequences of this property (see Section 2) to
considerably enlarge its domain.
Step 4: Consider the setHk :¼ fg 2LðXkÞ : ð8ðx1; . . . ; xk1Þ 2 Xk1Þðgðx1; . . . ; xk1; Þ 2HkÞg
of gambles onXk. Observe that we have deﬁnedHk as a set of gambles onXk, but
it can equally well (and actually should) be considered a set of gambles onXN that
are Xk-variable. We shall henceforth leave all such trivial identiﬁcations implicit.
The setHk is easily seen to be Bk-closed. In fact, it is the smallest Bk-closed set of
gambles that contains all the f^ k for fk 2Hk. It also contains all Bk-measurable
gambles, simply because we took care to assume from the outset thatHk contains
all constant gambles. Now consider any g in Hk, then we have that
g ¼Pz2Xk1gðz; ÞIBz , where gðz; Þ 2Hk for all z 2 Xk1, and therefore separate
coherence [see the discussion in Section 2] leaves us with no other choice but to let
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precbP kðgjBzÞ ¼ bP kðgðz; ÞjBzÞ ¼ Pkðgðz; ÞjzÞ ð22Þ
for all z inXk1. In particular, we see that By 2Hk and that bP kðBy jBzÞ ¼ dz;y (Kro-
necker delta) for all y; z 2 Xk1.
The construction above provides us with conditional lower previsions bP kðjBkÞ with
domainsHk, for k ¼ 1; . . . ;N . The following lemma shows that these previsions are sep-
arately coherent.
Lemma 5. The conditional lower previsions bP kðjBkÞ on Hk are separately coherent, for
k ¼ 1; . . . ;N .Proof. Since the domains Hk are Bk-closed and contain all Bk-measurable gambles, we
may invoke Proposition 1. Consider therefore any z 2 Xk1, any m; nP 0, and any gam-
bles g0; g1; . . . ; gn in H
k. For this ﬁxed value z, consider the gambles f‘ ¼ g‘ðz; Þ,

















½f‘ðxkÞ  Pkðf‘jzÞ  m½f0ðxkÞ  Pkðf0jzÞ
" #
P 0;
where the inequality follows from the coherence of the lower prevision Pkð j zÞ onHk. h
Hence, we are able to identify conditional lower previsions with respect to variables as
conditional lower previsions with respect to partitions, and this identiﬁcation allows us to
impose and interpret requirements of joint coherence on the former.
Next, observe that all gambles in the domainHk of the separately coherent conditional
lower prevision bP kðjBkÞ are not only Bk-but also Bkþ1-measurable, i.e., Xk-variable, for
k ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1. If we also remark that the partitionsBk are increasingly ﬁner, we see that
we are in a position to apply our Marginal Extension Theorem. We shall see that this the-
orem takes on a remarkably intuitive and simple form when written in terms of random
variables, rather than partitions. But before we can appreciate its full power and elegance,
we need to take one more (small) step, which is related to the identiﬁcation of conditional
lower previsions with respect to variables with their counterparts with respect to
partitions.
Indeed, in order to apply the theorem, we need to ﬁnd, for each Bz 2 Bk, i.e., for each
z 2 Xk1, the (unconditional) natural extension bEkðjBzÞ of the coherent lower previsionbP kðjBzÞ from its domain Hk to the set LðXkÞ (essentially) of all Bkþ1-measurable gam-
bles, for k ¼ 1; . . . ;N .15 This leads to the separately coherent conditional lower previsionbEkðjBkÞ deﬁned on the set LðXkÞ of all Bkþ1-measurable gambles.The set of BNþ1-measurable gambles is simply LðXN Þ, and the reason why we introduced BNþ1 as well, is
isely to be able to treat the case k ¼ N in one sweep with the other cases.
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EkðjzÞ of the coherent lower prevision PkðjzÞ from the subsetHk ofLðXkÞ to all gambles
on Xk. This leads to the conditional lower prevision EkðjX k1Þ deﬁned onLðXkÞ. The fol-
lowing lemma tells us that there is an interesting, and perhaps at this point unsurprising,
relationship between bEkðjBkÞ and EkðjX k1Þ, which extends in a natural way the relation
(22) between bP kðjBkÞ and PkðjX k1Þ.
Lemma 6. Let k 2 f1; . . . ;Ng. Then for all Bkþ1-measurable gambles g on XN , or in other
words for all g in LðXkÞ, and for all z in Xk1, it holds thatbEkðgjBzÞ ¼ Ekðgðz; ÞjzÞ:
Proof. First of all, it is easy to see that because bP kðjBkÞ is separately coherent onHk, its
(unconditional) natural extension bEkðjBkÞ to LðXkÞ is separately coherent as well. As a
result [see Eq. (8)], we ﬁnd that
bEkðf jBzÞ ¼ bEkðf ðz; ÞjBzÞ
for any Bkþ1-measurable, i.e., X
k-variable, gamble f and any z in Xk1. Let, then, g be any
gamble on Xk and z any element of X
k1. Clearly, it now only remains to show thatbEkðgjBzÞ ¼ EkðgjzÞ:



















ki½giðy; xkÞ  Pkðgiðz; ÞjzÞ
" #
:
If we now recall that Bz 2Hk, and that bP kðBzjBzÞ ¼ PkðXkjzÞ ¼ 1, we see that the right-
hand side can be rewritten as
sup
gi 2Hk;kiP 0






















ki½giðy; xkÞ  Pkðgiðz; Þ j zÞ
)
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ki½giðy; xkÞ  Pkðgiðz; ÞjzÞ 
Xm
i¼1





ki½giðy; xkÞ  giðz; xkÞ



















ki½fiðxkÞ  Pkðfi j zÞ
" #
¼ EkðgjzÞ: 
We are now ready to prove the following:Theorem 4 (Marginal Extension Theorem for variables). Let us consider the separately
coherent conditional lower previsions P 1, P 2ð j X 1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjXN1Þ, with respective domains
Hk LðXkÞ, k ¼ 1; . . . ;N . Then1. P 1, P 2ð j X 1Þ; . . . ; PN ð j XN1Þ are jointly coherent and have separately and jointly coher-
ent extensions to all of LðXN Þ;
2. the point-wise smallest separately and jointly coherent extensions to LðXN Þ are
M1;M2ð j X 1Þ; . . . ;MN ð j XN1Þ, where
M1 ¼ E1ðE2ð   ðEN ðjXN1ÞÞ    jX 1ÞÞ;
and
MiðjX i1Þ ¼ EiðEiþ1ð   ðEN ðjXN1ÞÞ    jX iÞjX i1Þ
for i ¼ 2; . . . ;N . In this expression, for each z in Xk1, EkðjzÞ is the (unconditional) natural
extension of the coherent lower prevision PkðjzÞ to LðXkÞ, which can be extended uniquely
by separate coherence to all Xk-variable gambles f by Ekðf jzÞ :¼ Ekðf ðz; ÞjtzÞ, for
k ¼ 1; . . . ;N .Proof. The proof is simple now, with all the preparatory scaﬀolding in place. We know
that partitions Bk are increasingly ﬁner, that the conditional lower previsions bP kðjBkÞ
are separately coherent, and deﬁned on domains Hk that are Bkþ1-measurable. So we
can apply the Marginal Extension Theorem to ﬁnd that they are jointly coherent and have
coherent extensions to LðXN Þ. This translates back to the ﬁrst statement of the present
theorem. But we may in addition infer that the point-wise smallest jointly and separately
coherent extensions toLðXN Þ are actually given by bM 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; bMNðjBNÞ, where, with
the notations established above,
bMkðjBkÞ ¼ bEkðbEkþ1ð. . . ðbEN ðjBN ÞÞ . . . jBkþ1ÞjBkÞ:
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theorem. h
The idea behind this theorem is the following: since the natural extension E1 of P 1 rep-
resents marginal information about the value that X1 assumes, we must concatenate it with
E2ðjX 1Þ in order to have information about the value assumed by ðX 1;X 2Þ. Then we con-
catenate this with the natural extension E3ðjX 2Þ of P 3ðjX 2Þ, and, if we follow this process,
we get to the lower prevision M onLðXN Þ which models the information about the value
that XN assumes. In particular, the conditional lower previsions MðjXkÞ model the ‘infor-
mation’ about the value that ðX kþ1; . . . ;XN Þ assumes conditional on the value taken by the
ﬁrst k variables in the process, X 1; . . . ;X k.
6. Marginal versus natural extension
It behoves us to compare the procedure of marginal extension we have studied in the
previous sections to the notion of natural extension for conditional lower previsions devel-
oped by Walley in [10, Section 8.1].
Consider conditional lower previsions PkðjBkÞ deﬁned on linear spacesHk LðXÞ for
1 6 k 6 N , that are separately and jointly coherent. Then Walley [10, Section 8.1.1] deﬁnes
their natural extensions F 1ðjB1Þ; . . . ; F N ðjBN Þ to LðXÞ in the following way: for each
f 2LðXÞ and each B0 2 Bk, F kðf jB0Þ [this is the value of F kðf jBkÞ on B0] is deﬁned as





GðfijBiÞðxÞ  IB0ðxÞ½f ðxÞ  a
" #
< 0 for all B 2
[N
i¼1
SiðfiÞ [ fB0g; ð23Þ
where the supports Si(fi) are deﬁned by Eq. (10). See [9] for an extension of this notion to
the case of conditional lower previsions deﬁned on domains that are not necessarily linear
spaces.
In the particular case where we only have an unconditional lower prevision P , and noth-
ing else, this notion of natural extension F agrees with the one (E) given by Eq. (6). But we
should be very careful in more general situations. Indeed, in the previous sections, we have
sometimes considered the (unconditional) natural extensions EkðjBkÞ of the lower previ-
sions PkðjBkÞ for all Bk in Bk, leading to the conditional lower prevision EkðjBkÞ. This
conditional lower prevision, obtained through (unconditional) natural extension, will in
general be diﬀerent from, and will actually be dominated by, the (conditional) natural
extension F kðjBkÞ. The reason is, of course, that in constructing EkðjBkÞ, we only con-
sider the assessments present in the PkðjBkÞ, but not the ones incorporated in the other
conditional lower previsions P ‘ðjB‘Þ with ‘ 6¼ k.
Also, the natural extensions given by Eq. (23) may not possess some of the properties of
the unconditional natural extension: their most important drawback is that they may not
be the point-wise smallest jointly coherent extensions. This may happen for instance
because there simply are no jointly coherent extensions to all ofLðXÞ of the given jointly
coherent conditional lower previsions. But even if there were, the natural extensions gen-
erally only provide a lower bound for the smallest jointly coherent extensions, and they are
the point-wise smallest jointly coherent extensions if and only if they are jointly coherent
themselves (see [10, Theorem 8.1.2 and Example 8.1.3]).
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in the speciﬁc situation considered in this paper, where we have separately coherent lower
previsions PkðjBkÞ conditional on a sequence of increasingly ﬁner partitions Bk, such that
moreover PkðjBkÞ is deﬁned on a set of Bkþ1-measurable gambles for k ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1.
We know from Theorem 2 that these conditional lower previsions are jointly coherent,
and have jointly coherent extensions to all of LðXÞ. We have even characterised the
point-wise smallest such extensions MkðjBkÞ. From our discussion above, the natural
extensions F kðjBkÞ provide only a lower bound for the smallest coherent extensions,
and therefore F kðjBkÞ 6 MkðjBkÞ for all k ¼ 1; . . . ;N . It remains to be seen whether these
two extensions agree in general. Only in that case will these natural extensions be jointly
coherent! The answer to this question is negative, as the following counterexample shows.
It deals with a single partition, and it is therefore already relevant even in the context of
Walley’s simpler version of the Marginal Extension Theorem (Theorem 1, discussed in
Section 2). We therefore use the notations established there.
Example 1. Let us consider the possibility space X ¼ X1 X2, where X1 ¼ X2 ¼ ½0; 1,
and the partition B ¼ fBx1 : x1 2 X1g, where Bx1 :¼ fx1g X2. Also consider the subsets
K ¼ fkp1 : k 2 Rg andH ¼ gp2 : g 2LðX1Þf g ofLðXÞ, where the gamble kp1 is deﬁned
by kp1ðx1; x2Þ ¼ kx1, and the gamble gp2 by gp2ðx1; x2Þ ¼ gðx1Þx2. Then it is easy to verify
that K and H are linear subspaces of LðXÞ. Let us deﬁne the linear (and therefore
coherent lower) prevision P on K by
P ðkp1Þ ¼ k;
and the conditional linear prevision P ðjBÞ on H by
P ðgp2jBx1Þ ¼ gðx1Þ
for any x1 in X1. Since P ðjBx1Þ is a linear (and therefore coherent lower) prevision onH
for all x1, P ðjBÞ is separately coherent.16 Moreover, any gamble in K is B-measurable.
Hence, we may apply Walley’s Marginal Extension Theorem (Theorem 1) and conclude
that the point-wise smallest jointly coherent extensions toLðXÞ are M and MðjBÞ, where
for each x1 in X1, MðjBx1Þ is the (unconditional) natural extension of P ðjBx1Þ toLðXÞ, E
is the unconditional natural extension of P to the set of B-measurable gambles, and M is
deﬁned on LðXÞ by M ¼ EðMðjBÞÞ.
We calculate the value of M in the gamble f on X, given by
f ðx1; x2Þ ¼ 0; if ðx1; x2Þ ¼ 1
1
n ; 1 1n
 
for some n > 0;
1; otherwise:

We ﬁrst calculate Mðf jBx1Þ ¼ Mðf ðx1; ÞjBx1Þ ¼ Eðf ðx1; ÞjBx1Þ [the equalities follow from
the fact that MðjBÞ is separately coherent, and Eq. (8)]. We get, using the formula for
(unconditional) natural extension in Section 2,16 Since the Bx1 do not belong toH, this statement may seem surprising. But it is easily veriﬁed that the natural
extension EðjBx1 Þ of the coherent lower prevision P ðjBx1 Þ assumes the value one in Bx1, so adding the assessments
PðBx1 jBx1 Þ ¼ 1 in no way affects the coherence and natural extensions of P ðjBx1 Þ. In this sense, PðjBÞ is indeed
separately coherent.









½f ðx1; y2Þ  ½gðy1Þy2  gðx1Þ:
First, let x1 ¼ 1 1m for some m > 0, and consider the gamble g on X1 given by gðy1Þ ¼ m
for all y1 in X1. Then
inf
ðy1;y2Þ2X








This tells us that Eðf ðx1; ÞjBx1ÞP 1, and since f 6 1, it follows from the coherence of the
lower prevision EðjBx1Þ that Eðf ðx1; ÞjBx1Þ 6 1. So we may conclude that Mðf jBx1Þ ¼ 1
when x1 ¼ 1 1m for some m > 0. Now, for any x1 in X1 that differs from 1 1m for all
m > 0, the gamble f ðx1; Þ on X2 is identically 1, and the coherence of the lower prevision
EðjBx1Þ then implies that Eðf ðx1; ÞjBx1Þ ¼ 1. This implies that the gamble Mðf jBÞ is iden-
tically 1, whence Mðf Þ ¼ EðMðf jBÞÞ ¼ Eð1Þ ¼ 1, using the coherence of the (uncondi-
tional) natural extension E of P.
Let us now study the natural extension F of the pair P, P ðjBÞ to a coherent lower
prevision onLðXÞ, and in particular its value F ðf Þ in the gamble f. We use Eq. (23), with
N = 2 and B0 ¼ X, B1 ¼ fXg, B2 ¼ B, Gðf1jB1Þ ¼ f1  P ðf1Þ ¼ kp1  k for all f1 ¼ kp1
in H1 ¼K, and Gðf2jB2Þ ¼ gp2  g for all f2 ¼ gp2 in H2 ¼H. Since B0 ¼ X, we see
that the supremum over all B in
S2
i¼1SiðfiÞ [ fB0g in Eq. (23) will be negative if and only if
the supremum over X is negative, so we getF ðf Þ ¼ supfa : ð9fi 2Hi; i ¼ 1; 2Þðsup½Gðf1jB1Þ þ Gðf2jB2Þ  ðf  aÞ < 0Þg
¼ sup
fi2Hi


























where the last equality holds because all g are bounded. Hence, F ðf Þ 6 0, and since f P 0
and F is a coherent lower prevision, we also have that F ðf ÞP 0, whence
F ðf Þ ¼ 0 < 1 ¼ Mðf Þ: the natural and the marginal extensions do not coincide on the
gamble f.
This example shows that, in the situations considered in this paper, the procedure of
natural extension may fail to lead to jointly coherent (conditional) lower previsions,
and the marginal extensions must be considered instead. Interestingly, Walley proves in
[10, Theorem 8.1.8.] that, when one of the lower previsions P 1ðjB1Þ ¼ P 1 is an
unconditional one, as is the case in our counterexample, and in the context we dis-
cussed for marginal extension for variables, the natural extension F 1 is the point-wise
smallest extension of P 1 to LðXÞ that is coherent with the original coherent lower
previsions P 1; P 2ðjB2Þ; . . . ; PNðjBNÞ. However, as we deduce from the previous counter-
example, this does not imply that F 1 is still jointly coherent with the extensions
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F and F ðjBÞ are not jointly coherent. Therefore, if we really want to exploit the behav-
ioural dispositions present in these (conditional) lower previsions to extend all of them
to the set of all gambles, we must consider their marginal extensions instead of their
natural extensions.
It would be interesting to study under which conditions marginal extension and natural
extension agree onLðXÞ; from our discussion above, we see that it would suﬃce to check
when the natural extensions deﬁned through Eq. (23) are jointly coherent. It is claimed in
[10, Theorem 8.1.9] that this is the case as soon as all the partitions Bk, k ¼ 1; . . . ;N are
ﬁnite (and, in the case of variables, when these take values in ﬁnite sets). Although
Walley’s general theory of natural extension assumes the linearity of the domains
H1; . . . ;HN , nothing essential changes if we consider conditional lower previsions deﬁned
on arbitrary sets of gambles; the only diﬀerence would be that we would replace each
GðfijBiÞ in Eq. (23) by a ﬁnite linear combination
Pni
k¼1kikGðf ki jBiÞ, with kik P 0 and
f ki 2Hi, for all k ¼ 1; . . . ; ni where i ¼ 1; . . . ;N [9]. See also [3] for some additional com-
ments on the relationship between the marginal and natural extensions in the case of
variables.
In the case of a conditional lower prevision P ðjBÞ and an unconditional lower previ-
sion P with respective domainsH andK, and where all the gambles inK are B-measur-
able (as in our example), we deduce from the comments above that the marginal and
natural extensions coincide when H ¼LðXÞ. If moreover P ðjBÞ is a linear prevision,
then they are the only extensions that preserve joint coherence.
7. The forward irrelevant product
Let us apply, as a ﬁnal step in this development, the Marginal Extension Theorem for
variables to a particular case. Consider, as before, N > 0 random variables X 1; . . . ;XN tak-
ing values in the respective non-empty sets X1; . . . ;XN . For each variable Xk, a subject has
information about the value it assumes in Xk, which he models in terms of a (marginal)
coherent lower prevision Pk deﬁned on a set of gambles Hk LðXkÞ. As we argued
before, we can assume without loss of generality that all these domains include the con-
stant gambles.17 Let Xk and Xk denote the product variables and spaces as in Eqs. (20)
and (21).
Our subject now assesses that his beliefs about the value that the random variable Xk
assumes in Xk will not change after observing the values of the ‘previous’ variables
X 1; . . . ;X k1. This is an assessment of so-called forward epistemic irrelevance, and it can
be expressed by means of conditional lower previsions PkðjX k1Þ, k ¼ 2; . . . ;N , where
Pkðf jx1; . . . ; xk1Þ ¼ Pkðf Þ ð24Þ
for any ðx1; . . . ; xk1Þ in Xk1 and all f 2Hk.
In summary, we have the following assessments: a unconditional (marginal) lower pre-
vision P 1 deﬁned onH1, and conditional lower previsions PkðjX k1Þ deﬁned onHk, which
17 We shall also assume here that the domains Hk of the marginal lower previsions Pk are cones, i.e., closed
under multiplication with non-negative real numbers. This will considerably simplify the proof of Proposition 5
further on. We can make this assumption without loss of generality, because by coherence, if P ðf Þ is given, then
the uniquely coherent value for P ðkf Þ is kPðf Þ for all real kP 0. As a consequence, the domainsHk considered
further on in this section are cones as well.
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for 2 6 k 6 N .
So we see that we have landed squarely in the domain where our Marginal Extension
Theorem for variables (Theorem 4) can be applied to conclude that the point-wise smallest
jointly coherent extensions of P 1, P 2ðjX 1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjXN1Þ to LðXN Þ are given by
M1;M2ðjX 1Þ; . . . ;MN ðjXN1Þ, where
M1 ¼ E1ðE2ð   ðEN ðjXN1ÞÞ    jX 1ÞÞ;
and
MiðjX i1Þ ¼ EiðEiþ1ð   ðEN ðjXN1ÞÞ    jX iÞjX i1Þ
for i ¼ 2; . . . ;N , using the notations established in Theorem 4. Let us take a close look at
these expressions, using what we have learned in Section 5. Let f be any gamble onXN . We
may then apply Lemma 6 to ﬁnd that for any ðx1; . . . ; xN1Þ in XN1,
MNðf jx1; . . . ; xN1Þ ¼ EN ðf jx1; . . . ; xN1Þ ¼ ENðf ðx1; . . . ; xN1Þ; Þ
where EN is the (unconditional) natural extension of the marginal PN to all gambles onXN .
It will be convenient to let EN ðf Þ denote the gamble on XN1 that assumes the value
ENðf ðx1; . . . ; xN1Þ; Þ ¼ EN ðf jx1; . . . ; xN1Þ in the element ðx1; . . . ; xN1Þ ofXN1. More gen-
erally, if h is a gamble on Xk, we shall denote by EkðhÞ the gamble on Xk1 that assumes
the value Ekðf ðx1; . . . ; xN1Þ; Þ ¼ Ekðf jx1; . . . ; xk1Þ in the element ðx1; . . . ; xk1Þ of Xk1,
where Ek is the (unconditional) natural extension of the marginal Pk to all gambles on
Xk. If we now apply Lemma 6 again for k ¼ N  1 to the gamble h ¼ ENðf Þ on XN1,
we ﬁnd that for any ðx1; . . . ; xN2Þ in XN2,
MN1ðf jx1; . . . ; xN2Þ ¼ EN1ðhjx1; . . . ; xN2Þ ¼ EN1ðhÞðx1; . . . ; xN2Þ
¼ EN1ðhðx1; . . . ; xN2; ÞÞ ¼ EN1ðEN ðf Þðx1; . . . ; xN2; ÞÞ
¼ EN1ðEN ðf Þðx1; . . . ; xN2; ; ÞÞ;
where EN1 is the (unconditional) natural extension of the marginal PN1 to all gambles on
XN1. Again, we denote by EN1ðEN ðf ÞÞ the gamble on XN2 that assumes the value
EN1ðEN ðf Þðx1; . . . ; xN2; ; ÞÞ for any ðx1; . . . ; xN2Þ in XN2. The pattern that is emerging
should by now be quite clear:
Mkðf jx1; . . . ; xk1Þ ¼ EkðEkþ1ð. . . ðEN ðf ÞÞ . . .ÞÞ;
and in particular we ﬁnd for the unconditional (joint) lower prevision M1 on X
N
M1ðf Þ ¼ E1ðE2ð   ðEkþ1ð   ðEN ðf ÞÞ   Þ   ÞÞÞ:
M1 is called the forward irrelevant product of the marginal lower previsions P 1; . . . ; PN . It is
obtained by ﬁrst using EN to ‘integrate out’ the last variable, then using EN1 to ‘integrate
out’ the next but last variable, . . ., and ﬁnally using E1 to ‘integrate out’ the only remain-
ing, ﬁrst, variable.
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is easy to derive the following interesting recursion formula from the discussion above: for
all gambles f on Xk:
Mkðf Þ ¼ Mk1ðEkðf ÞÞ: ð25Þ
The lower previsions M1, MkðjX k1Þ, k ¼ 2; . . . ;N are the point-wise smallest jointly
coherent extensions of P 1, PkðjX k1Þ to the set of all gambles on XN , or in other words,
the point-wise smallest jointly coherent extensions of the marginals P 1; . . . ; PN together
with the forward epistemic irrelevance assessment (24).
If we are only interested in extending P 1 and preserving joint coherence with
P 2ðjX 1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjXN1Þ, without extending the latter, then the natural extension F can
be used. This natural extension will be called in this context the forward irrelevant natural
extension of the marginals P 1; . . . ; PN . It is dominated byM1 onLðXN Þ, because in general
the natural extension is dominated by all jointly coherent extensions. F is the point-wise
smallest extension of P 1 to LðXN Þ that is jointly coherent with P 2ðjX 1Þ; . . . ; PN ðjXN1Þ,
but it need not in general be jointly coherent with the corresponding extensions
M2ðjX 1Þ; . . . ;MN ðjXN1Þ. M1 is, however, and it can be very easily calculated.
To see that these two extensionsM1 and F do not coincide in general, it suﬃces to check
that what we have done in Example 1 is nothing but calculate the marginal and the natural
extensions of the coherent marginal lower previsions P 1 and P 2 deﬁned on respective
domains H1 :¼fkp1 : k2RgLðX1Þ and H2 :¼fkp2 : k2RgLðX2Þ by P 1ðkp1Þ :¼ k
and P 2ðkp2Þ :¼ k for any k2R, under the additional assumption of epistemic irrelevance.
In the rest of this section, we take a closer look at a number of properties of both the
forward irrelevant product M1 and the forward irrelevant natural extension F . Before
doing this, we need some further preparation. First of all, we derive an explicit expression
for the forward irrelevant natural extension F .
It is clear, recalling the discussion and the notations leading to Theorem 4 in Section 5,
that F is the natural extension of the conditional lower previsions bP kðjBkÞ deﬁned by
bP kðgjBzÞ :¼ Pkðgðz; ÞÞ
for all z 2 Xk1, on domains Hk given by
Hk :¼ fg 2LðXkÞ : ð8ðx1; . . . ; xk1Þ 2 Xk1Þðgðx1; . . . ; xk1; Þ 2HkÞg:
Now consider any gamble f on XN . Taking into account that the domains Hk are cones
but not linear spaces, F ðf Þ is equal to (see Section 6 and [9, Deﬁnition 6 and Theorem








bGðgjkjBkÞðxÞ  ½f ðxÞ  a
" #
< 0:
Now clearlybGðgjkjBkÞ ¼ X
z2Xk1
IBz ½gjk  Pkðgjkðz; ÞÞ;
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½gjkðx1; . . . ;xkÞPkðgjkðx1; . . . ;xk1; ÞÞ
" #
j¼ 1; . . . ;nk;nkP 0
k¼ 1; . . . ;N
: ð26Þ
Finally, let F k denote the forward irrelevant natural extension of the ﬁrst k marginals
P 1; . . . ; Pk.














EkðfkÞ:Proof. We give a proof by induction on N, where N P 1. It is obvious that the result holds
for N = 1, since M1ðf1Þ ¼ F 1ðf1Þ ¼ E1ðf1Þ. Assume therefore that the result holds for




‘, then for any ðx1; . . . ; xn1Þ in Xn1 we have that snðx1; . . . ; xn1; Þ ¼
sn1ðx1; . . . ; xn1Þ þ fn, so it follows from the coherence of the lower prevision En1 that
Enðsnðx1; . . . ; xn1; ÞÞ ¼ Enðsn1ðx1; . . . ; xn1Þ þ fnÞ ¼ sn1ðx1; . . . ; xn1Þ þ EnðfnÞ;
and from Eq. (25) and the coherence of the lower prevision Mn that





where last equality follows from the induction hypothesis. We deduce that F nðPnk¼1fkÞ 6
MnðPnk¼1fkÞ ¼Pnk¼1EkðfkÞ. Let us prove the converse inequality.
First of all, consider a gamble gk onHk, for k 2 f1; . . . ; ng. Then, we deduce from Eq.
(26) that F nðgkÞP PkðgkÞ: it sufﬁces to take gjk ¼ gk, nj ¼ 1 and ni ¼ 0 for all i 6¼ j. As a
consequence, we deduce that F nðgkÞP EkðgkÞ for all gambles fk on Xk, and for all
k ¼ 1; . . . ; n: Ek is the smallest coherent extension of Pk to LðXkÞ, and is therefore
dominated by all coherent lower previsions on LðXkÞ that dominate Pk on its
domain. The super-additivity of F n implies then that F nðPnk¼1fkÞPPnk¼1F nðfkÞPPn
k¼1EkðfkÞ. h
We can generalise this result and prove the additivity ofMN and F N on sums of gambles
that depend on diﬀerent variables. This means that if we consider two gambles f and g
whose values depend on the outcome of diﬀerent (disjoint) parts of the sequence
ðX 1; . . . ;XN Þ, then our supremum betting rate on the gamble f + g should be the sum of
our supremum betting rate on f and our supremum betting rate on g. However, and in
contradistinction with the previous result, we shall not have in general the equality
between MN and F N on these sums.
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products: F N and MN are extensions of the marginals Pk.
Proposition 4. Let fk be any gamble on Xk. Then F N ðfkÞ ¼ MN ðfkÞ ¼ EkðfkÞ. If in particular
fk belongs to Hk, then F N ðfkÞ ¼ MN ðfkÞ ¼ PkðfkÞ, for all 1 6 k 6 N .Proof. Immediately from Proposition 3 and the coherence of the marginal lower previ-
sions Pk, which tells us that EkðfkÞ ¼ PkðfkÞ for fk in Hk and k ¼ 1; . . . ;N . h
The forward irrelevant natural extension and product also satisfy a (restricted) product
rule.
Proposition 5 (Product rule). Let fk be a non-negative gamble on Xk for 1 6 k 6 N . Then
F N ðf1    fN Þ ¼ MNðf1    fN Þ ¼ E1ðf1Þ   EN ðfN Þ;
F N ðf1    fN Þ ¼ MNðf1    fN Þ ¼ E1ðf1Þ   EN ðfN Þ:
In particular, let Ak be any subset of Xk for 1 6 k 6 N . Then
F N ðA1      AN Þ ¼ MN ðA1      AN Þ ¼ E1ðA1Þ   EN ðAN Þ;
F N ðA1      AN Þ ¼ MN ðA1      AN Þ ¼ E1ðA1Þ   EN ðAN Þ:Proof. We shall prove the result for the lower previsions. The proof for the conjugate
upper previsions is similar. We ﬁrst prove the equality for the forward irrelevant product
and then for the forward irrelevant natural extension. We apply induction on N. It is obvi-
ous that the result holds for N = 1. Assume therefore that the result holds for N ¼ ‘ 1
(where ‘P 2), then we prove that the result holds for N ¼ ‘ as well. Let fk be a non-neg-
ative gamble on Xk for 1 6 k 6 ‘. Then for any ðx1; . . . ; x‘1Þ 2 X‘1,
E‘ðf1    f‘Þðx1; . . . ; x‘1Þ ¼ E‘ðf1ðx1Þ    f‘1ðx‘1Þf‘Þ ¼ f1ðx1Þ    f‘1ðx‘1ÞE‘ðf‘Þ;
since all gambles fk are non-negative, and E‘ is a coherent lower prevision. Then, using Eq.
(25),
M ‘ðf1    f‘Þ ¼ M ‘1ðE‘ðf1    f‘ÞÞ ¼ M ‘1ðf1    f‘1E‘ðf‘ÞÞ ¼ M ‘1ðf1    f‘1ÞE‘ðf‘Þ
¼ E1ðf1Þ   E‘1ðf‘1ÞE‘ðf‘Þ
taking into account the coherence of the lower prevision M ‘1 and the fact that the coher-
ence of the lower prevision E‘ implies that E‘ðf‘ÞP inf f‘ P 0. The last equality follows
from the induction hypothesis. Since we already know that F ‘ðf1    f‘Þ 6 M ‘ðf1    f‘Þ ¼
E1ðf1Þ   E‘ðf‘Þ, we now set out to prove the converse inequality. If E‘ðf‘Þ ¼ 0, the coher-
ence of the lower prevision F ‘ implies that
F ‘ðf1    f‘ÞP 0 ¼ E1ðf1Þ   E‘ðf‘Þ ¼ M ‘ðf1    f‘Þ:
Assume therefore that E‘ðf‘Þ > 0, and consider 0 <  < E‘ðf‘Þ. Then it follows from the
deﬁnition of the (unconditional) natural extension E‘ [see Eq. (6) and use the fact that
the domains Hk are assumed to be cones] that there are n‘ P 0 and gambles g
j
‘ in H‘
for j ¼ 1; . . . ; n‘ such that





½gj‘ðx‘Þ  P ‘ðgj‘Þ
" #
P E‘ðf‘Þ  : ð27Þ
Deﬁne the gambles hj‘ on X
‘ by hj‘ :¼ f1 . . . f‘1gj‘. All these gambles18 belong toH‘. Now,














½hj‘ðx1; . . . ; x‘1Þ
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 P ‘ðhj‘ðx1; . . . ; x‘1; ÞÞ
#
;
and after some manipulations, using the coherence of P ‘ and the fact that all the fk are
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bGðgji jBiÞ þ f1ðx1Þ . . . f‘1ðx‘1Þ½E‘ðf‘Þ  
" #
:
Summing all this up, and using Eq. (26) for N ¼ ‘ 1 and f ¼ f1 . . . f‘1½E‘ðf‘Þ  , we get
that
F ‘ðf1    f‘ÞP F ‘1ðf1    f‘1½E‘ðf‘Þ  Þ ¼ ½E‘ðf‘Þ  F ‘1ðf1 . . . f‘1Þ
¼ ½E‘ðf‘Þ  E1ðf1Þ . . .E‘1ðf‘1Þ;
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the coherence of the lower prevision F ‘1 and the fact
that E‘ðf‘Þ   > 0, and the second equality from the induction hypothesis. Since this hap-
pens for  arbitrarily close to 0, we deduce that indeed
F ‘ðf1    f‘ÞP E1ðf1Þ   E‘ðf‘Þ:
The second part of the proposition follows immediately from the ﬁrst. h
These and other properties of the forward irrelevant product allows us to establish laws
of large numbers for coherent lower previsions, see [2] for more information.18 This holds because we assumed that the domains Hk of the marginal lower previsions Pk are cones. See
footnote 17.
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The problem of coherently extending a number of assessments is one of the most impor-
tant in the theory of subjective probability. When these assessments are represented by
means of an unconditional lower prevision, the way to do so is by means of Walley’s
notion of natural extension. This extension has a clear behavioural interpretation and
can also be given a Bayesian sensitivity one, as a lower envelope of linear extensions.
The task becomes more involved when the assessments are of a more complicated nat-
ure, and are represented by means of conditional lower previsions. In that case, Walley’s
notion of natural extension does not generally yield the smallest coherent extensions, but
only a lower bound for them. This cannot be helped in some cases, because there may not
be any coherent extensions at all; but in other cases there are coherent extensions, but the
procedure of natural extension may fail to produce any of them. This leads us to search for
the smallest coherent extensions, which will reﬂect the minimal behavioural consequences
of the given assessments.
Walley has proved that when we have an unconditional and a conditional lower previ-
sion with some properties, the smallest coherent extensions are obtained through the pro-
cedure of marginal extension. In this paper, we have extended his result to the case where
we have a ﬁnite number of lower previsions conditional on increasingly ﬁner partitions.
The marginal extensions then provide the smallest coherent extensions, and moreover have
a sensitivity analysis representation as lower envelopes of linear previsions. As such, they
prove to be superior of the ones obtained through natural extension.
In essence, what our results tell us is that if we have hierarchical assessments (which is
the idea behind the increasingly ﬁner partitions, and more clearly behind the representa-
tion for variables), the way to extend these assessments to all gambles is to use uncondi-
tional natural extension at each hierarchical level, and then use concatenation. Moreover,
this concatenation is equivalent to Bayes’s rule in the case of linear conditional and uncon-
ditional prevision.
As topics for further research, we suggest the study of the smallest coherent extensions
under other conditions, and the investigation of the equality between natural and marginal
extensions. We would also like to mention our suspicion that it may be possible to ﬁnd a
simpler, or perhaps more directly intuitive, proof for our Marginal Extension Theorem.
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